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THE CHARLES STREET JAIL LITIGATION: THE 
ALLOWABLE EXTENT OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
INVOLVEMENT 
Francine Sherman Tucker* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade federal district courts have, under a grant of 
equity power extended to them by Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871,1 become involved in an increasing number of prison and 
jai12 reform cases. These cases are representative of public law litiga-
tion, the analysis of which is facilitated by the public law litigation 
model. 3 Under the public law litigation model federal district court 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW 
I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section, as amended provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ofthe United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
The parallel jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4) (1976), provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to 
be commenced by any person: ... 
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution 
of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of 
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; 
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress 
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. 
2 Generally, convicted prisoners are incarcerated in state operated prisons while detainees 
are housed in jails owned and maintained by cities and counties. Constitutional Limitations 
on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 943 (1970). 
3 The public law litigation model was developed by Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard 
University and is presented in Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). For elaborations of this model see: Note, Implementation Prob-
lems In Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARv. L. REv. 428 (1977); Special Project, The 
Remedial Process In Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COL. L. REV. 784 (1978). 
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judges, in an effort to insure compliance with the Constitution, 
assume an expansive role in decree formulation, implementation 
and enforcement.· Moreover, under this model the litigation is div-
ided into two stages: the right-violation stage, in which the court 
determines whether a protected right has been violated, and the 
remedy stage, in which the judge issues an extensive remedial de-
cree and assumes a central monitoring and enforcement role in se-
curing its implementation.s 
In prison and jail reform cases, remedial decrees generally order 
either the correction of the unconstitutional conditions within the 
facility, or the closing of the offending institution.6 Initial reliance 
for implementation of the decree rests on the good faith of the par-
ties. 7 However, if the responsible legislative and executive officials 
of state and local government are unwilling or unable to comply 
with the decree, the judge is forced to assume an activist role which 
tests the extent of the remedial powers of the lower federal courts.8 
In Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. EisenstadtD (Inmates I), 
a federal district court in Massachusetts found violations of the 
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees incarcerated in Boston's 
Charles Street Jail. The court held that these violations were too 
extensive to be remedied in a piecemeal fashion within the confines 
of the existing jail and, therefore, ordered the defendant-officials to 
close the jail by June 30, 1976.10 However, due to complex legal and 
political problems, many of which typify the problems involved in 
the implementation of public law remedial decrees, the Charles 
• Id. 
• See text at notes 87-96, infra. See also Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284. For an explanation 
of the division between the right-violation and the remedy stages of the litigation, see id. at 
1293-94; see also Special Project, supra note 3, at 790. For a particularly well developed and 
illuminating discussion of equitable remedies in public law litigation, see Goldstein, A Swann 
Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1978). 
• Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in 
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 367, 375-76 (1977). 
7 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir_ 
1971); see also, Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Goldstein, supra note 
5, at 66. 
8 For case studies of the implementation of four prison and jail remedial decrees, see M. 
HARRIS & D. SPILLER, JR., AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORREC-
TIONAL SETTINGS (1977). See generally Johnson, The Constitution and The Federal District 
Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 903 (1976). 
• 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 977 (1974), aff'd as modified, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975). I. 360 F. Supp. at 691. 
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Street Jail remains unrenovated and yet is still in operation. II 
This article discusses the Charles Street Jail litigation in light of 
the equitable power of federal courts and the public law litigation 
model. The first section examines the equity provision of Section 
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its use as a vehicle for 
plaintiffs seeking a federal remedy for civil rights violations by state 
or local officials. Next, the article examines how the federalist prin-
ciple of deference to local control of institutions limits equitable 
remedies in civil rights suits; the school desegregation cases of the 
past three decades serve as the precedent for federal court involve-
ment in situations where local officials have failed to remedy civil 
rights violations. The article then presents the public law litigation 
model as a basis for the analysis of cases involving both school 
desegregation and the conditions inside prisons and jails. Finally, 
this model is applied to the Charles Street Jail litigation. 
II. THE EQUITABLE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
The history of federalism reflects an attempted balance between 
state autonomy and the protection of individual liberties. Prior to 
the Civil War, the states enjoyed considerable autonomy, reflecting 
the federalists' fear of a tyrannical, centralized government. 12 Since 
the states and their citizens supposedly shared common interests, 
the states were considered the safest receptacle for individualliber-
tiesY The Civil War, however, shattered that belief. 14 Through such 
11 Since the Charles Street Jail litigation is so protracted, this article will discuss the 
litigation only through October 2, 1978. However, it should be noted that on May 7, 1979 the 
attorneys for all parties to this litigation and Judge Garrity signed a consent decree, Inmates 
of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 7, 1979), which provides 
that the defendants will construct, maintain and operate a new pretrial detention facility on 
the Charles Street Jail site. Moreover, the new facility will be "designed and built according 
to the standards and specifications contained in the 'Suffolk County Detention Center, 
Charles Street Facility Architectural Program' date January 1, 1979 ... " with certain modi-
fications which are listed in the consent decree. [d. at 2. Issuance of this consent decree was 
the last action on the Charles Street Jail litigation by Judge Garrity. Due to the appointment 
and confirmation of four new federal district court judges in Massachusetts (N.Y. Times, 
March 22, 1979 at A7, col. 1) the Charles Street Jail litigation will hereinafter be heard by 
Judge Robert E. Keeton. 
12 See generally Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007 
(1966). 
,3 For example, Federalist No. 46 noted: 
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it 
beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the 
governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a greater number 
of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and 
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legislative enactments as the Civil Rights Act of 1871,15 the federal 
government became the new protector of individual liberties, and 
has continued in that capacity from Reconstruction through the 
federal courts' involvement in civil rights litigation during the past 
three decades. 
A. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
Section 1983 (now 42 U.S.C. § 1983) initially appeared as part of 
the Ku Klux Act of 1871,18 passed by a Congress concerned with the 
violence of the Ku Klux Klan and the inability of state governments 
to curb its activities. 17 The purpose of the Act was as follows: 
to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, 
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, 
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be 
denied by the state agencies. IS 
Within this context, Section 1983 has three main goals: (1) to give 
the federal district courts power to override discriminatory state 
laws;l» (2) to provide a federal remedy where the state law is inade-
quate;20 and (3) to provide a remedy when local officials fail to use 
their authority to remedy constitutional violations. 21 
The provision in Section 1983 which allows for "suit[s] in eq-
uity"22 supplies lower federal court judges with the degree of flexibil-
emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and 
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the anairs of 
these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members 
of these will a greater proportion of the people have ties of personal acquaintance and 
friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the 
popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison) (The New American Library of World Literature 1961), 
at 294-95 (emphasis added). In another essay appearing in THE FEDERALIST, Hamilton wrote: 
"[TJhe State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security 
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (A. 
Hamilton). Id., at 181. 
.. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1135 
(1977) (hereinafter cited as Developments In the Law). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see text of Section 1983 at note I, supra. 
" Act of April 20, 1871, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
17 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-76 (1961). 
18 Id. at 180. 
It Id. at 173. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 174. 
22 See text of Section 1983 at note I, supra. 
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ity necessary to effectuate adequate remedies for constitutional vio-
lations. The equity power of a court is well suited for this task 
because it is designed to insure that no wrong is suffered without a 
remedy.23 Therefore, once a federal court finds that a protected right 
has been violated it may invoke its broad and flexible equity power 
in order to remedy the violation.24 
Despite the broad potential of Section 1983 actions brought in 
federal court seeking to redress violations of individual rights by 
state officials, the section was rarely used prior to the 1940'S.25 How-
ever, during that decade the Supreme Court resurrected Section 
1983 in two cases in which it interpreted the provision making the 
section applicable to any person acting "under color of law"28 to 
include persons acting "under 'pretense' of law." Aided by this lib-
eral interpretation, the Court in United States v. Classic 27 reversed 
a dismissal of charges against election officials who had fraudulently 
counted ballots in a primary, and in Screws v. United States28 held 
a sheriffs fatal beating of a prisoner viola.tive of Section 1983. Thus, 
despite the fact that no state law actually sanctioned the defen-
dant's conduct and such conduct was, in fact, violative of state law, 
these cases nevertheless granted federal courts jurisdiction to pro-
vide redress. 
Section 1983 emerged again in a 1961 suit concerning an unrea-
sonable search by Chicago policemen acting "under color oflaw."2U 
Mter a discussion of the legislative history of Section 1983 and an 
enumeration of its goals, the Court noted that "[t]he federal rem-
edy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not 
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."30 
Subsequent to this case, the number of Section 1983 actions in-
creased dramatically, with many individuals seeking redress for 
civil rights violations. 31 
.. 2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 423-24 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941). 
.. See quotations in text ~ ,,~. 5~~d 63, infra· 
.. Developments in the Law,. !l.4i»'a note 14, at 1161. 
.. See text of Section 1983 at note 1, supra. 
27 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
28 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
II Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) . 
.. [d. at 183. 
31 In 1960 a total of 280 Section 1983 suits were filed, while in 1972 this number increased 
to 8,000. Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 1172. In 1976, of a total of 140,189 civil 
actions filed in federal court, 12,911 were general civil rights actions and 6,341 were state 
prisoner rights actions brought under Section 1983. ADMINISTRATIVE OmCE OF THE UNITED 
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B. Federal Equity Power at the Remedy Stage 
Despite the fact that Section 1983 has been broadly construed to 
control the actions of any individual acting "under 'pretense' of 
law" the longstanding notion of federal deference to local control of 
institutions has limited the power of federal courts to order intrusive 
remedies in institution reform cases. In the context of prison and jail 
reform litigation, this notion has been responsible for "[t]he tradi-
tional 'hands-off' doctrine, holding that federal courts are powerless 
to interfere with the operation of state and county correctional insti-
tutions . . . . "32 Although recent recognition of the outrages exist-
ing in prisons and jails has caused the "hands-off" doctrine to par-
tially give way to federal court action where constitutional viola-
tions exist,33 nevertheless the notion of federal deference to local 
control of institutions remains a limitation on the power of a federal 
court to order intrusive remedies. The effect of this limitation on 
remedial power has been particularly apparent in the context of 
school desegregation cases. The Supreme Court has noted that 
"[n]o single tradition ... is more deeply rooted than local control 
over the operation of schools. . ., "34 so that "the federal courts in 
devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and 
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the 
constitution. "35 
1. "Our Federalism" - An Expansion of Federal Deference to 
Local Control of Institutions 
The notion of federal deference to local control of institutions is 
rooted in federalism,38 a doctrine which concerns the degree of au-
STATES COURTS, 1976 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 86, cited in Developments in the Law, 
supra note 14, at 1136 n.7. 
32 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Mass. 1973). 
33 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, remanded in 
part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. 
Ala. 1979) (receivership ordered). 
" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (Milliken I). 
" Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (Milliken II). 
38 Goldstein, supra note 5, at 6. The principle of federal court deference to local control of 
institutions also stems from the doctrine of separation of powers. However, separation of 
powers is generally applied to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the same 
level of government. [d. at 7-8 n.43. For an analysis of the position that separation of powers 
limits the authority of federal courts to order remedies which interfere with local governmen-
tal functions, see Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 
30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). . 
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tonomy from federal interference retained by the states. In a num-
ber of recent decisions articulating "Our Federalism,"37 the United 
States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of state autonomy 
and, consequently, limited the scope of federal remedies of constitu-
tional violations. The Court first articulated this concept in Younger 
v. Harris,38 holding that, absent a bad faith prosecution, harrass-
ment or unusual circumstances, federalism and comity bar federal 
court injunctions of pending state criminal proceedings. In Rizzo v. 
Goode,39 the Court extended the concept of federalism in order to 
restrict federal interference with the actions of local officials. In 
Rizzo a group of black residents of Philadelphia brought a Section 
1983 class action alleging a pattern and practice of police miscon-
duct in that city. The federal district court, finding the existence of 
such a pattern and practice, issued a mandatory injunction compel-
ling the City Police Commissioner to effectuate a court-ordered 
method for handling citizen complaints. 40 However, the Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that, since the plaintiffs had failed to link 
the supervising city and police department officials to the incidents 
of misconduct of their subordinates, no constitutional violation ex-
isted. 41 In addition the Court noted that, barring "extraordinary 
circumstances,"42 principles of federalism prevent the issuance of 
federal injunctions not only against state judicial proceedings but 
against state officials as well. 43 
The Rizzo holding lacks support in a study of the history of feder-
alism. In The Federalist Papers, James Madison wrote: "[t]he 
federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and 
trustees of the people, constituted with different powers and de-
signed for different purposes."44 In Madison's view, federal power 
comes directly from the people and not derivatively from the people 
37 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); 
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Simon v. Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
38 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). 
" 423 U.S. 362 (1976) . 
•• COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974). 
" [d. at 371. 
.. [d. at 379. 
" [d. at 380 . 
.. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison)(The New American Library of World Literature 
1961), at 294. 
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through the states. Such a conception of federalism is necessarily 
antithetical to the holding of Rizzo. Rizzo assumes that federal 
power must be constricted in order to expand state power and 
thereby preserve the people's freedom. However, Madison's views 
portray both the states and the federal government as direct guaran-
tors of personal liberty, so that neither entity's powers should be 
restrained unless directly needed to secure individual rights. 45 
In order to determine that no constitutional violation existed, the 
Court in Rizzo focused on the language of Section 1983 which pro-
vides that "[e]very person who, under color of [law] subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured .... "46 Thus the Court found that the require-
ments for Section 1983 liability had not been met because: 
there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various 
incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 
by petitioners - express or otherwise - showing their authorization or 
approval of such misconduct.47 
However, the Court's requirement that the plaintiffs show a "plan 
or policy" of police misconduct contravenes the goals of Section 
1983. This section is applicable to Rizzo since the "under color of 
law" provision includes acts of both local officials and their subordi-
nates. 48 First, the district court's finding of acts of racial discrimina-
tion "with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed as rare, 
isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by the city 
authorities to punish such infractions or to prevent their recurr-
ence, "49 indicates that Rizzo actually involved the failure of local 
officials to enforce state laws for the protection of individual rights; 
such a situation is precisely the problem which Section 1983 was 
intended to rectify.50 Additionally, the district court's remedy order-
ing the institution of a method for handling citizen complaints did 
.. See generally, Michelman, States' Rights and States' Rules: Permutations of 
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, 
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essen-
tial Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977). 
It Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976). See also text of Section 1983 at note 1, supra. 
" Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) . 
• s Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), cited in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 361, 384 
(1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
II Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 386 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
50 See text at note 21, supra. 
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not excessively intrude into the local control of the police depart-
ment and was enforceable within the structure of that institution.51 
The deprivation of individual liberties to which a strict applica-
tion of Rizzo's federalism would lead can be avoided through a 
narrow construction of that holding. In a case challenging the condi-
tions of confinement in the District of Columbia Jail, the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did so construe the 
Rizzo holding: 
Rizzo actually holds that a federal court should refrain from assuming 
a comprehensive supervisory role via its injunctive powers over broad 
areas of local government for the purpose of preventing speculative and 
probably only sporadic future misconduct by local officials toward an 
imprecise class of potential victims, especially when that misconduct is 
not part of a pattern of persistent and deliberate official policy.52 
Thus, under the Circuit Court's interpretation, a court is still free 
either to assume a limited supervisory role, or to enjoin widespread 
civil rights violations or to intervene where a pattern of police mis-
conduct exists. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court held that no 
constitutional violation existed in Rizzo, a lower federal court may 
be justified in characterizing and dismissing Rizzo's federalism lan-
guage as mere dicta. Consequently, despite the expansion of state 
autonomy, the concept of federalism does not preclude the intrusion 
of federal courts, to some degree, into state affairs in order to rem-
edy constitutional violations. The amount of intrusion permissible 
is defined in the school desegregation cases. 
2. Federal Remedial Power Employee in School Desegregation 
Cases 
The remedies ordered in the school desegregation cases of the past 
three decades closely paralleled those ordered in suits concerning 
the conditions within prisons and jails-both in terms of the equity 
power which the federal courts employed and in terms of the limita-
tions on that power. 53 In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of 
Education54 (Brown I), the Supreme Court held that the Kansas 
school segregation laws denied the complainant class of black stu-
" Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 387 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
" Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For a similar perfunctory 
treatment of Rizzo, see Hoss v. Cuylor, 452 F. Supp. 256, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
53 See generally Special Project, supra note 3, at 788 n.9 . 
• 4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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dents equal protection of the laws. After re-argument on the issue 
of relief, the Supreme Court, in Brown II,55 remanded the case to the 
district court to enter whatever orders were "necessary and proper 
to admit [complainants] to public schools on a racially nondiscri-
minatory basis with all deliberate speed. . . . "56 The general equity 
power articulated by the Court in Brown II became the authority 
for future decisions based on the Brown I mandate: 
the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor 
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of each particu-
lar case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The quali-
ties of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice 
adjustments and reconciliation between the public interest and private 
needs as well as between competing private claimsY 
The intransigence of local officials forced the lower federal courts 
in later desegregation cases to order intrusive equitable remedies in 
order to enforce the Brown I mandate.58 For example, in Griffin u. 
County School Board of Prince Edward County,59 resistance to de-
segregation motivated the school board of Prince Edward County, 
Virginia to close public schools, to supply tuition grants to white 
children attending private segregated schools and to give tax rebates 
to contributors to these private schools. In an effort to remedy this 
resistance, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order 
both enjoining the county from making these tuition grants and tax 
exemptions and requiring that local schools be opened as long as 
other public schools in the state remained open.60 Most signifi-
cantly, the Court authorized the district court to require the county 
to levy taxes for the purpose of operating public schools.61 
The Griffin court's extremely intrusive order was not an isolated 
instance of the use of equitable power. Rather, district courts re-
peatedly ordered intrusive remedies even when faced with lesser 
degrees of resistance on the part of local officials. For example, in 
Swann u. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,62 the Court 
55 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
56 [d. at 301. 
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 n.5 (1955), citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 
321, 329-30 (1944). 
58 See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 244-72 (1962). 
" 377 U.S. 218 (1964) . 
.. [d. at 222-25. 
" [d. at 233. 
" 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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reiterated the nature of a federal district court's equitable power 
and further clarified the degree of local intransigence which war-
ranted exercise of that power: 
if school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations . . . judicial 
authority may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been 
shown, the scope of the district court's equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies.83 
Employing these broad equitable powers, the Court ended seven 
years of litigation by affirming an extensive lower court order man-
dating busing, which required the Board of Education to expend 
additional sums amounting to one and one half percent of the total 
district budget. 84 
In Swann the Court announced the proposition that "the nature 
of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."6ii Thus, nar-
rowly construing the nature of the violation will likewise limit the 
scope of the remedy. This was the result in Milliken v. Bradley66 
(Milliken I), where the Court utilized both a narrow characteriza-
tion of the nature of the violation67 and the principle of federal 
deference to local control of public education68 in order to defeat an 
interdistrict busing order aimed at remedying segregation in the 
Detroit city schools. The district court in Milliken I based its order 
for an interdistrict remedy on the twin findings that the state of 
Michigan was responsible under the State Constitution for the oper-
ation of the entire Detroit school system and that the dense black 
population in the city of Detroit, coupled with the prospect of 
"white flight," would render an intradistrict plan ineffective. fiB The 
Supreme Court, narrowly construing the nature of the violation, 
held that the desegregation remedy must be aimed at "the condition 
alleged to offend the Constitution-the segregation within the De-
13 [d. at 15. 
14 Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal 
Courts?, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 113, 121 (1975). The plan ordered by the district court was 
a synthesis of a plan proposed by the school board for the junior and senior high schools and 
one proposed by a court appointed expert for the elementary schools. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 9 (1971). 
IS [d. at 16 . 
.. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
" See id. at 744-45 . 
.. [d. at 743·44. 
It Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
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troit City School District."70 The Court further held that "without 
an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no consti-
tutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."71 Thus, after a 
remand, the Court, in Milliken v. Bradley72 (Milliken II), ended 
almost six years of litigation over the remedy73 by affirming an in-
tradistrict busing order. Nonetheless, since the intradistrict scope 
of the remedy now fit the Court's characterization of the nature of 
the violation, the Court affirmed other wide-ranging aspects of the 
district court order such as remedial educational programs, in-
service training for teachers, an alternative testing program and 
counselling and career guidance geared toward the problems of 
school children undergoing desegregation.74 
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman75 the Court also based 
its reversal of a district court desegregation order on a restrictive 
characterization of the nature of the violation. The district court 
had found a "cumulative violation"78 of the Equal Protection Clause 
in Dayton's racially imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones 
and certain decisions of the Board of Education.77 Mter the Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit twice remanded district court orders 
finding the remedies insufficient,78 the district court ordered, and 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, a systemwide remedy including an ex-
tensive busing plan, pairing of schools, a variety of special programs 
and magnet schools.78 The Supreme Court reversed, finding: 
the disparity between the evidence of constitutional violations and the 
sweeping remedy finally decreed requires supplementation of the record 
and additional findings addressed specifically to the scope of the rem-
edy. It is clear that the presently mandated remedy cannot stand upon 
the basis of the violations found by the District Court.80 
Thus, the Court held that the district court must determine the 
"incremental segregative effect"81 of the School Board action and 
71 [d. at 738. 
11 [d. at 745. 
72 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
73 [d. at 269. 
" [d. at 272-88. 
" 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
" [d. at 413. 
77 [d. 
78 Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974); 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1975). 
71 433 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1977) . 
.. [d. at 419 . 
• , [d. at 420. 
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tailor its remedy to fit that effect. 
The impact which Dayton will have on equitable remedies is un-
clear in light of Milliken II. Dayton and Milliken II were decided on 
the same day.82 However, in Milliken II the Court implicitly rejected 
the analysis in Dayton by affirming four wide-ranging educational 
remedies, finding that they were "necessary to restore the victims 
of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have enjoyed 
in terms of education had these four components been provided in 
a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system free from pervasive 
de jure racial segregation. "83 Yet some of these educational remedies 
would not have passed the restrictive "incremental segregative ef-
fect" test of Dayton. 84 For example, the Court in Milliken II affirmed 
in-service training for teachers without finding that inadequacy 
among the teachers was the result of state discrimination.Hi; Thus, 
in future cases, if the Court applies the broad test of Milliken II and 
the earlier desegregation cases, it will preserve flexibility in equita-
ble remedies; however, if the Court applies the "incremental segre-
gative effects" test of Dayton, it will greatly constrict the availabil-
ity of equitable remedies. 88 
3. The Public Law Litigation Model 
Suits seeking reform of prison and jail conditions, the school de-
segregation cases and other institution reform cases fit the model of 
public law litigation to varying degrees. This model separates the 
right-violation stage and the remedy stage.87 Under this model, 
the party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over 
the course of the litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is 
suffused and intermixed with negotiating and mediating processes at 
every point. The judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding 
the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their 
counsel, but on a wide range of outsiders-master, experts, and over-
sight personnel. Most important, the trial judge has increasingly be-
come the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief, which 
have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the 
82 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 292 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). 
83 Id. at 282 . 
.. See text at notes 80-81, supra . 
.. Goldstein, supra note 5, at 42 . 
.. Id. at 40-43. 
81 See text and note at note 5, supra. 
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judge's continuing involvement in administration and implementa-
tion. 88 
After the lower federal court judge determines that a constitution-
ally protected right has been violated, the judge engages in an im-
plicit balancing process, weighing the plaintiff's constitutional 
rights with the defendant's right to control the operation of its insti-
tutions. 89 The judge then issues an initial decree which seeks to 
remedy the plaintiff's rights but which is sufficiently broad so that 
the parties may determine the details of compliance. DO Next, the 
district court judge monitors compliance through a variety of unin-
trusive monitoring devices. 91 Throughout the monitoring stage of the 
litigation, the balance weighs in favor of deference to local control 
of the institution.92 However, if the judge determines that the local 
officials have not attempted to achieve good faith compliance with 
the decree, then the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs outweigh 
the defendant's right to control its institutions, and the judge's role 
changes from that of mere monitor to that of enforcer of the initial 
decree. 93 Enforcement con~ists of formal actions which the court 
uses to expedite the defendant's compliance and which necessarily 
intrude upon local control of the institution.D4 
In the context of school desegregation, Brown I established the 
analytical framework for the right-violation and Brown II articu-
lated the remedy. The Brown II remedy - desegregation with all 
deliberate speed - mandated vindication of the constitutional right 
yet was extremely vague and left implementation details to the 
district courts and local officials. Therefore, the court's initial de-
cree was unintrusive and exhibited great deference to local control 
of the schools. In each of the subsequent school desegregation cases, 
" Chayes, supra note 3, at 1284 . 
.. [d. at 1292-93. Chayes says that this balancing process is necessary due to "the prospec-
tive character of the relief [which] introduces large elements of contingency and prediction 
into the proceedings." [d. at 1292. See also Special Project, supra note 3, at 791, 864-66. 
'" Chayes, supra note 3, at 1292; Special Project, supra note 3, at 800-01, 869. 
" These devices include: retention of jurisdiction; mandatory compliance reports; and use 
of monitors such as special masters, citizens' committees, expert panels, ombudsmen, lay 
advocates, and attorneys. Note, supra note 3, at 440-45. See also Special Project, supra note 
3, at 815-37. 
" Monitoring devices are unobtrusive and preserve the defendants' rights to local control 
of their institution. 
93 Enforcement mechanisms intrude into the defendants' rights to local control and thus 
can only be justified if based on a court determination that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights 
outweighed the defendants' rights to local control. Special Project, supra note 3, at 927-29 . 
.. Note, supra note 3, at 448-53; Special Project, supra note 3, at 837-42. 
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the lower federal courts determined that the defendants had not 
tried to achieve good faith compliance with the Brown II mandate. 
After noting the defendant's noncompliance, the district courts 
sought to enforce the desegregation mandate by specifically charac-
terizing the nature of the violations and ordering remedies which 
varied in intrusiveness. u5 As long as these intrusive remedies fit 
within the nature of the violation and were prompted by the defen-
dant's recalcitrance, the Supreme Court held that they were allowa-
ble intrusions into local control.U6 In essence, as a result of the defen-
dant's proven lack of good faith the equitable balance in each of 
these cases weighed in favor of immediate vindication of the plain-
tiffs rights through use of intrusive enforcement mechanisms. 
III. THE CHARLES STREET JAIL LITIGATION 
In the past decade, lower federal courts have decided a tremen-
dous number of suits seeking reform of prisonu7 and jailUS conditions . 
.. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 762-67 (1978) . 
.. See text at notes 54-86, supra. 
" Federal courts have ordered major prison reform in the following cases: Preston v. 
Thompson, 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Edwards, 546 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Parker v. Cook, 464 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Jordan v. Robinson, 464 F. Supp. 223 
(W.D. Pa. 1979); Burks v. Walsh, 461 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Finney v. Mabry, 455 
F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Ark. 1978), 458 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. 
Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part and remanded, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); Johnson 
v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part and remanded, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th 
Cir. 1978); M.C'!. Concord Advisory Board v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1978); Owen 
v. Schuler, 466 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.!. 
1977),448 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1978) (civil contempt order); Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 
114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, October 2,1978, reversed sub 
nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 25 Crim. L. Rep. 3053 (May 16, 1978); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. 
Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Todaro 
v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977); Anderson v. 
Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977); Bell v. Manson, 427 F. Supp. 450 (D. Conn. 1976), 
rev'd and remanded, 590 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1978); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250 
(D.N.H. 1976), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977), remanded, 581 
F.2d 275 (lat Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1976), 421 F. Supp. 
740 (N.D. Ohio 1976), 431 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ohio 1977), 446 F. Supp. 1184 (N .D. Ohio 1977), 
455 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976); 
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. 
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) 
(receivership ordered); Costello v. Wainright, 497 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on 
other grounds, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976) (en bane), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 
(1977); Bell v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass. 1975); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 
(E.D. Okla. 1974), aff'd, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (improper conditions ordered recti-
fied), 457 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D Ark. 1973), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th 
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Such suits fit, to varying degrees, the public law litigation model. 
The Charles Street Jail litigation illustrates the potential for the 
operation of this model in a jail setting. The presiding judge, Massa-
chusetts Federal District Court Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., first 
found that the conditions in the jail violated the inmates' due pro-
cess rights and then engaged in a balancing process to determine the 
scope of the initial remedial decree. The court was wary of exces-
sively intruding into local control of the jail and with this as its basis 
continued to balance the interests of the parties throughout the 
monitoring stage and, thereafter, during the court's direct enforce-
ment of its decree. Although Judge Garrity's enforcement device 
might be viewed as ultimately effective because it pressured the 
defendants to propose and approve a plan for construction of a new 
jail,99 the court's overall treatment of this case will probably be 
Cir. 1974), aff'd, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 
549 (E.D. La. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972),407 F. Supp. 1117 
(N.D. Miss. 1975), 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977), 
454 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 
aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 503 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975), 
466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (receivership ordered); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 
(E.D. Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
o. Federal courts have ordered major jail reform in the following cases: Smith v. Sullivan, 
553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 
392 (2d Cir. 1975); Lock v. Jenkins, 464 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 
457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978), 
457 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Vest 
v. Lubbock County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Ambrose v. Malcolm, 
440 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. 
Mich. 1977),446 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. 
Mo. 1977), aff'd in part, modified in part, 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978); Inmates of Henry 
County Jail v. Parham, 430 F. Supp 304 (W.D. Ga. 1976); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567 
(D. Neb. 1976); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Tate v. Kassulke, 
409 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Sykes v. Kreiger, 451 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ohio 1975); 
Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975), modified in part and remanded, 392 F. 
Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975), modified, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977); Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 
F. Supp. 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 377 F. 
Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), judgment 
entered, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.1975), modified, 396 F. Supp.1195 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff'd 
per curiam, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion 
to reopen institution); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973), 429 F. Supp. 
370 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (amended consent judgment approved); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 
411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 
(1975); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 
F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971),358 F. 
Supp. 338, 361 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 330 F. 
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), 
440 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Hamilton v. Shiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970). 
II See text at notes 239-262, infra. See also note 11, supra. 
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viewed as ineffective because after six years of remedy formulation 
the plaintiffs are still confined in unconstitutional conditions within 
the Charles Street Jail. Resolution of the Charles Street Jaillitiga-
tion might have been expedited if the court had fully employed the 
public law litigation model. 
A. Right- Violation Stage: The Constitutional Violation 
The Charles Street Jail litigation began in 1971 with the filing of 
a Section 1983 class action on behalf of all the inmates housed at 
Boston's Suffolk County Jail (Charles Street Jail), challenging the 
constitutionality of the conditions in the jail. lOo The merits of that 
challenge were decided in 1973.101 The Charles Street Jail has been 
in use since 1848 and is both the oldest public building still utilized 
in Boston and one of the oldest jails in the country,I02 In its findings 
of fact the district court noted that the jail consists of four wings 
which meet at an open, central, rectangular rotunda. The north, 
south and east wings house male inmates and the west wing con-
tains administrative offices, medical facilities and an auditorium 
used variously as a chapel, theatre and recreation area. The jail is 
comprised of five tiers, with the rotunda opening onto the second 
tier. The first tier, referred to as the flats, is used as a dining area 
in addition to containing cells. The cell blocks extend from floor to 
ceiling with a catwalk providing access to each tier and, along the 
sides of the cell blocks, to each cell. The acoustics are poor and 
noises made anywhere in the jail are heard constantly throughout 
the jail. 103 Female inmates were housed in a separate annex consist-
ing of one cell block, with four tiers on each side and ten cells to a 
tier. However, in 1974 the female inmates were transferred from the 
Charles Street Jail under a court order designed to reduce the in-
mate population. 104 In 1973 only 142 out of 180 cells for men were 
100 Brief of Inmates of Suffolk County Jail as Appellants in 77·1361 and Appellees in 77-
1362 and 77-1363 at 4, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney (1st Cir.). 
101 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Ma~s. 1973). 
,.2 Letter to Visitors to the Charles Street Jail from Dennis J. Kearney, Sherif]' of Suffolk 
County, at 2. 
,.3 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 679-80 (D. Mass. 
1973). 
I •• This order is referred to on appeal: Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 
494 F.2d 1196, 1198 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. 419 U.S. 977 (1974). See also text 
at note 128-129, supra. Since the female inmates were transferred, the annex now houses 
mostly young male first offenders whom the jail administrators feel are benefited by being 
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operable; the others, due to various defects, were not usable. lua 
According to the findings of the district court which were facili-
tated, in part, by observations which Judge Garrity made during a 
night he and his law clerk spent in a cell in the jail,IU6 the cells are 
approximately eight feet wide by eleven feet long by ten feet high. 1U7 
Although constructed for single occupancy, in 1973 each cell housed 
two inmates. Furnishings included two cots, a toilet, a metal slab 
built into the wall for writing or storage, a sink with only cold 
running water, a few wall pegs and one sixty-watt light bulb. Since 
the cells were cramped, double cell occupancy led to constant physi-
cal contact and resulting tension between occupants. The cells are 
heated by means of blowers at the end of each tier; thus, the upper 
tiers are extremely hot in the summer and the lower tiers are frigid 
in the winter. The plumbing system is similarly antiquated and 
frequently floods; the toilets and sinks are corroded and present a 
serious health hazard}08 Moreover, the jail is a fire hazard partially 
because, in the event of a fire, the cells must be individually un-
locked and there is but a single fire ladder which is located in the 
east wing. lOB In addition, roaches, rats, mosquitoes and waterbugs 
are a constant problem. llo 
The plaintiffs alleged that the totality of conditions in the jaillll 
violated their rights under the cruel and unusual punishment provi-
segregated from the repeat offenders. Conversation with Mr. Tom Downey; Community Af-
fairs Officer, Suffolk County Sheriffs Office (March 15, 1979 at the Charles Street Jail). 
'05 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D. Mass. 1973). 
, .. [d. at 680-81 n.5, 8 . 
• 07 [d. at 679 . 
... [d. at 679-80. 
'0' [d. at 680. In addition there is no back-up electrical generator; thus, the effect of any 
fire or catastrophe in the jail could be compounded by lack of electrical power. [d. 
110 [d. The court's fact finding methods included interviews with the inmates, review of 
reports by expert commissions condemning the Charles Street Jail, and the use of expert 
testimony. In addition, Judge Garrity and his law clerk spent a night in a cell in the jail. [d. 
at 680-81 n.5, 8. These fact finding techniques are used in most prison and jail cases, although 
usually the judge merely tours the facility. It should be noted that the additional effort 
expended by Judge Garrity during the fact finding stage was indicative of his extreme concern 
with the issues involved in this litigation. This concern was manifested in many of his actions 
throughout the course of the Charles Street Jail litigation. 
"' See generally Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded 
Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 372-76 (1977). "Under the 
totality of conditions approach . . . courts have held that prison conditions and practices 
which might not be unconstitutional if viewed individually can, when viewed as a whole, 
make confinement a cruel and unusual punishment." [d. at 372. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (the first case taking this approach). 
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sion of the Eighth Amendmentll2 and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 1I3 It is important to note that the vast 
majority of the Charles Street Jail inmates are pretrial detainees, 114 
and are in jail either because they did not post bailor because they 
are accused of a nonbondable offense. Therefore, they enjoy a pre-
sumption of innocence, as distinguished from those prisoners who 
have already been convicted of a crime and are serving their sent-
ences.115 
Suits concerning the housing conditions of state pretrial detainees 
are generally decided under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, while suits concerning such conditions for sent-
enced prisoners are reviewed under the cruel and unusual punish-
ment provision of the Eighth Amendment. 1I6 In Inmates I, after 
comparing the quality of incarceration at the Charles Street Jail 
with the quality of incarceration which the state designates as 
punishment for convicted inmates, the district court concluded 
that the conditions at the Charles Street Jail amounted to "pun-
ishment." Since "punitive measures are out of harmony with the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids the de-
privation of liberty without due process of law,"117 such measures 
are justified only to the extent that they accomplish the state's 
purpose of securing the detainees' appearance at trial. The district 
court held that, because detention at the Charles Street Jail was 
not the least drastic means of achieving this purpose, the plaintiff-
inmates were deprived of their substantive due process rights. liS 
112 U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII which provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual pl'~lishment inflicted." 
113 U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV which provides: "[nor] shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " In addition, based on their 
position as detainees they alleged violations of the First Amendment (freedom of religion, 
speech, and press) and Sixth Amendment (jury trial for crimes, counsel, and other procedural 
rights) and sought increased access to counsel, visitors and reading material. Inmates of the 
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678-79 (D. Mass. 1973). 
11. [d. at 681. 
11. See note 2, supra. 
118 See generally Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (Part II), 60 GEO. L. J. 1382 
(1972); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L. 
J.941 (1970). 
117 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D. Mass. 1973). 
118 [d. at 685-86. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes require-
ments of both substance and procedure. The substantive due process doctrine protects indi-
viduals from the government's unreasonable exercise of its police powers to deprive a citizen 
of life, liberty, or property. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - A TEXTBOOK, 165-66 (1972). 
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B. The Remedy Stage 
1. Inmates I-The Initial Decree 
Based on its finding that the conditions of confinement at the 
Charles Street Jail violated the plaintiff-inmates' due process 
rights, the district court ordered specific remedies. Most signifi-
cantly, the court enjoined the defendants-the Sheriff of Suffolk 
County,119 the master of the jail,I2O the Massachusetts Commis-
sioner of Correction,121 and the Mayor and nine City Councillors of 
the City of Bostonl22-from housing any pretrial detainee in the 
Charles Street Jail after June 30, 1976,123 This order was based on 
the court's finding that the physical limitations of the jail made it 
impossible to remedy all the constitutional violations within that 
facility.124 In order to ease the conditions of confinement during the 
interim period, the court ordered the defendants to make specific 
improvements. For example, the defendants were ordered to insti-
In a recent decision the Supreme Court established a restrictive standard of review for evalu-
ating whether particular conditions of confinement imposed on pretrial detainees violated the 
Due Process Clause. Bell v. Wolfish (May 16, 1979), 25 Crim. L. Rep. 3053 (1979). First, the 
Court held that under the Due Process Clause a pretrial detainee may not be punished. Thus, 
in evaluating conditions of confinement the test is whether those conditions amount to pun-
ishment. A showing of an intent to punish will suffice to prove punishment. However, if no 
such intent is shown a condition will not be deemed punishment if it is reasonably related to 
a legitimate, nonpunitive, governmental objective. The Court discussed two legitimate gov-
ernmental objectives-securing the detainee's appearance at trial and effective management 
of the detention facility. [d. 
II. The Sheriff of Suffolk County has primary custody and control over the jail. Inmates of 
the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1973). 
120 The master of the jail has ongoing responsibility for its daily operation. [d. 
'21 The Commissioner of Correction was the sole state defendant and is responsible for the 
supervision of the State correctional facilities. [d. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 124 § 1 
(1974). 
122 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1973). 
Under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 34 § 4 (1958), the Mayor of the City of Boston and the 
Boston City Councillors are also Suffolk County Commissioners. In their capacity as Suffolk 
County Commissioners, these parties have a variety ofresponsibilities concerning the Charles 
Street Jail: 
1. They are responsible for the expense of keeping and maintaining inmates. [d. ch. 126 
§§ 29, 30, 33 (1974); 
2. They are responsible for regular and emergency repairs and improvements to the jail. 
[d. ch. 34 § 14; 
3. In general they have "authority to represent their county, and to have the care of its 
property and the management of its business and affairs. . . ." [d.; 
4. They are responsible for the County's duty to provide a suitable jail. [d. at § 3.; 
Bartlett v. Willis, 3 Mass. 85, 102 (1807); Hawkes v. Inhabitants of County of Kennebeck, 
7 Mass. 461 (1811). 
123 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 691 (D. Mass. 1973). 
12. [d. at 686-87. 
1979] JAIL REFORM AND FEDERALISM 685 
tute single cell occupancy by November 30, 1973. 125 The court based 
this remedy on its finding that double-cell occupancy contributed 
to the overall unconstitutionality of the jail and that single-cell 
occupancy could be accomplished within the physical limitations of 
the jail. 126 
Inmates I was not appealed, reflecting an absence of overt resist-
ance to the decision on the part of the defendants.127 However, in 
1974 the Commissioner of Correction did appeal from an ancillary 
decree directed at compliance with the single-cell occupancy order, 
requiring transfer of all female detainees and all male detainees 
with state felony records from the Charles Street Jail. 128 The Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that failure to appeal the origi-
nal judgment created a jurisdictional bar to consideration of its 
merits on a later appeal. I29 Therefore, the conclusions of law of 
Inmates I, regarding the existence of constitutional violations, re-
main unchallenged. 
a. Limitations of the Initial Decree 
Although the court recognized "that constitutional requirements 
cannot be satisfied without construction of a new jail':'13u and that 
"the central effect of [its] order [was] the elimination and re-
placement of the present facility,"131 Judge Garrity merely ordered 
the closing of the Charles Street Jail. This order was based on the 
twin principles of federal court deference to local control of institu-
tions and federalism. 132 The closing order was not mandated under 
the nature of the violation limitation from Swann. 13l It might be 
argued that since the nature of the violation was the condition of 
the Charles Street Jail the court merely had the power to order a 
remedy related to that facility - either the reform or the closing of 
that jail. However, this argument is apparently incorrect. In fact, 
12. Id. at 691. 
128 Id. at 690. See text and note at note 162, infra. 
127 M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, JR., supra note 8, at 13. 
128 This order was referred to on appeal: Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 
494 F.2d 1196, 1198 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. 419 U.S. 977 (1974). 
12. Id. at 1199-1200. 
130 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686-87 (D. Mass. 
1973). 
131 Id. at 689. 
132 See text at notes 36-52, supra. 
133 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971). See also text at notes 
65-86, supra. 
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during the course of the remedy stage the court, in order to insure 
that the plaintiffs were provided with a constitutional remedy, was 
able to review and rule on the constitutionality of plans for a new 
jail which involved use of other facilities. 134 Moreover, it is obvious 
from the court's closing order that it envisioned an ultimate remedy 
outside the confines of the Charles Street Jail. Therefore, it must 
be concluded that in ordering the closing of the Charles Street Jail 
the court's sole constraint was that of deference to local control of 
the jail. 
The court's closing order in Inmates I was the least intrusive order 
possible given the court's finding that the conditions within the 
Charles Street Jail could not be reformed. However, in a jail setting, 
closing the offending facility is not a viable remedy because it does 
not accomplish the legitimate state purpose of securing the detai-
nees' appearance at trial, while its consequence, the release of the 
inmates, clearly threatens the public safety. Therefore, the indirect 
result of the court's order required the responsible local officials to 
propose and approve a plan for a new permanent jail meeting consti-
tutional standards. By providing a three year grace period before 
closing the jail, Judge Garrity balanced the inmates' interests in 
their due process rights against the defendants' interests in control 
of the institution. However, in order to monitor and aid the defen-
dants' efforts at providing a new facility and to affect a quick resolu-
tion of any subsequent dispute, the court retained jurisdiction and 
ordered the parties to submit periodic compliance reports. 13S Reten-
tion of jurisdiction is consistently used in institution reform cases 
since it reduces procedural obstacles during the implementation 
process by enabling the parties to make motions to amend, modify 
or enforce existing court orders without filing a new action. 13G 
Inmates I was one of the ground breaking jail reform cases; as 
such it has some of the problems characteristic of innovative litiga-
tion. While the court must be applauded for its progressiveness, the 
Charles Street Jail litigation suffered because the parties and the 
court were unable to benefit from the vast body of literature con-
cerning public law litigation which has since developed. If Judge 
.34 See text at notes 129-221, infra . 
• 35 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 691 (D. Mass. 1973) . 
• 38 M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, JR., supra note 8, at 17. In addition, retention of jurisdiction 
may have a symbolic effect as a reminder to the defendants of their compliance responsibili-
ties. [d. See also Special Project, supra note 3, at 816-17. 
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Garrity had had the benefit of the subsequently developed public 
law litigation model, numerous law review articles elaborating upon 
that model and subsequently decided cases, he might have chosen 
an alternative remedial combination at the decree formulation 
stage. Hindsight has shown that the court's remedial combination 
of closing order, retention of jurisdiction and periodic compliance 
reports was insufficient in aiding the defendants' efforts at provid-
ing a new jail. Under this remedial combination the court became 
a virtual bystander waiting for the defendants to propose a plan for 
court approval. In fact,' the defendants did not propose their first 
plan until 1975. 137 The public law litigation model indicates that 
alternative remedial combinations might have better facilitated 
the defendants' compliance efforts, with minimal additional intru-
sion into local control of the jail. 
b. Alternatives at the Decree Formulation Stage 
Under the public law litigation model, a variety of alternatives are 
available to the judge at the decree formulation stage which will 
expedite the remedy stage by facilitating implementation of the 
decree by the parties. While considerations of federalism mandate 
an open-ended decree, the remedies in both Brown II138 and Inmates 
I were unnecessarily vague. The implementation process following 
Brown II, for example, might have been expedited if that remedy 
had included specific desegregation techniques which met court 
approval. School boards attempting to desegregate their schools 
could thus have chosen the specific technique which best met their 
needs from among those offered by the Court. Similarly, although 
the Charles Street Jail litigation was based on a constitutional stan-
dard which any replacement jail had to meet, the court could have 
facilitated implementation of its decree by providing more specific 
standards to be met in a new pretrial detention facility,139 as well 
t37 See text at notes 164-187, infra. 
138 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
,3D See generally Note, supra note 3, at 437-39. While there were few sources in 1973 from 
which the court could have gleaned minimum standards, Massachusetts law now provides 
standards for pretrial detention facilities. See DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASSACHUSETTS, TENTATIVE DRAFI', STANDARDS FOR COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1978). 
These standards were incorporated into the Suffolk County Detention Center, Charles Street 
Facility, Architectural Program dated January 1, 1979 according to which the parties agreed 
to design and build a new facility. Consent Decree, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. 
Kearney, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 7, 1979). See note 11, supra. 
Courts in institution reform cases generally apply professional minimum standards rather 
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as possible locations and funding alternatives for that facility. Two 
avenues were available to the court to facilitate development of 
these specifications. 
First, the court could have sought input from parties to the litiga-
tion. This mechanism would have both mitigated the inherent in-
trusiveness of a judicially imposed remedy and provided the court 
with the benefit of the parties' expertise in the area of jail adminis-
tration and maintenance.l4o Since input from the parties usually 
promotes desirable results, the court should have required the de-
fendants and plaintiffs to submit suggestions to the court.141 More-
over, the court could have channelled the parties' involvement by 
providing guidelines as to the scope and form of these suggestions. 142 
If input from the parties had been utilized at the decree formulation 
stage of the Charles Street Jail litigation the political and budgetary 
factors which influenced the defendants' compliance in later stages 
of the litigation143 might have surfaced earlier. Consequently, the 
court could have taken some of these factors into consideration in 
delineating standards and plans, and could have warned the parties 
at the outset of those factors which it deemed insignificant. Further-
more, if Judge Garrity had sought input from the parties they might 
have been estopped at later stages of the litigation from disputing 
than ideal standards. Note, supra note 3, at 438. In Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 
(D.R.I. 1977), 448 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1978) (contempt order), the court measured the 
conditions at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions against "minimum stan-
dards." While the court noted that variance from these standards did not alone constitute a 
constitutional violation, variance was considered in determining the existence of constitu-
tional violations. [d. at 979-80 n.30. Moreover, the court specifically incorporated these 
"minimum standards" into its decree. In constructing the "minimum standards" the court 
considered standards published by professional bodies, leading cases and expert testimony 
from the trial. [d. at 990-94 . 
... Note, supra note 3, at 439-40; Chayes, supra note 3, at 1298-1300; Special Project, supra 
note 3, at 800-01. It should be noted that the court would not be bound to accept these 
suggestions. Rather, it could choose among them, combine them, or impose a combination 
of the suggestions and court-devised plans and standards. [d. at 802. 
,,, While considerations of deference to local control of institutions and federalism compel 
the court to seek input from the defendants in the course of the remedy stage, court-required 
input from the plaintiffs is more unusual. Federal district courts sought involvement from 
the plaintiffs in the following cases: Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. 
Malcom, 421 F. Supp. 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 
1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), cited in Special Project, supra note 3, at 802-04. 
,<2 Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 34-35 (M.D. Fla. 1975), vacated and remanded 
en bane, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977); Holt v. 
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd and remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 
1971), cited in Special Project, supra note 3, at 798. 
14' See text at notes 217-22, infra. 
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a plan which they suggested or which they participated in devising. 
Second, the court might have sought input from parties outside 
of the litigation. 144 For example, a special master could have been 
appointed to assist the court in formulating the specifications of the 
decree. 145 Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers 
a federal district court judge to appoint a special master with au-
thority to take all action necessary to fulfill his assigned tasks. 14K 
While the court must accept the master's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous,147 it can modify or reject any of his recommen-
dations. 148 However, in a non-jury case a district court's power to 
appoint a special master is limited to those situations involving 
exceptional conditions. us In the Charles Street Jail litigation, the 
closing order or the need for development of a plan for an alternate 
facility and minimum standards might have constituted a suffi-
ciently exceptional situation. 150 If the court had appointed a special 
master at the outset, he could have supervised out-of-court negotia-
... The court could have sought aid from amici curiae, experts, panels, advisory commit-
tees, professional bodies, monitors, administrators, ombudsmen and masters. Special Project, 
supra note 3, at 804; Chayes, supra note 3, at 1300-02; Note, supra note 3, at 440. Further-
more, once the decree is established, use of parties outside the litigation can be repeated 
during the implementation and enforcement stages of the litigation. Chayes, supra note 3, 
at 1301. See note 223, supra, and text at notes 179, 279-93, supra . 
... Special Project, supra note 3, at 805-09. See generally Note, supra note 3, at 451-52; 
Kaufman, Masters In The Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1958); Harris, The 
Title VII Administrator: A Case Study In Judicial Flexibility, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 56 
(1974); 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 53.05(2), 2946-62 (2d ed. 1979); Note, Monitors: A 
New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103, 114-15 (1960) . 
... The court should specify the master's duties in its order of reference and appointment. 
Special Project, supra note 3, at 806. Judge Garrity appointed a special master at a later stage 
of this litigation, and accordingly specified his duties. Order of Reference and Appointment 
of Master at 2, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. 
October 6, 1976). 
'47 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2). 
'" Special Project, supra note 3, at 806 . 
... Under the exceptional conditions requirement a court cannot appoint a special master 
prior to finding a violation. Id. at 807. 
". In Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), the court, in its initial opinion, 
appointed a special master to monitor the defendants' implementation of the initial decree. 
The court cited "the complex nature of the task at l1and, and the demands on the court's 
time and attention which would be entailed by direct court supervision of the remedial 
order," id. at 986, as its justification for the appointment. Although involving a special master 
in decree formulation would entail appointment prior to the initial opinion, justification in 
the Charles Street Jail litigation certainly equalled that cited in Palmigiano. Moreover, it 
should be noted that Palmigiano involved both a closing order and use of minimum stan-
dards. For a discussion of limitations on the appointment of masters in non-jury cases, see 
Kaufman, Masters In the Federal Court: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 455-59 (1958). 
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tion between the parties geared toward providing the court with 
standards and alternative plans which were acceptable to all the 
parties. 151 Moreover, the special master could have conducted hear-
ings and compiled minimum standards, and alternative plans for 
construction of a new pretrial detention facility which the court 
could have incorporated into the decree. 
2. Inmates II-The Bail Appeals Project 
In 1975 the district court ordered the city defendants l52 to assume 
funding for a "Bail Appeals Project"153 under which federal funds 
were apportioned by a state agency to provide bail for some of the 
inmates at the Charles Street Jail. The state agency responsible for 
apportioning these funds had discontinued funding for the project, 
and the city-defendants had decided to terminate the project rather 
than provide city funds for its continuance. 1M Since the "Bail Ap-
peals Project" facilitated compliance with the single cell occupancy 
order of Inmates I, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sought 
to avoid frustration of Inmates I by affirming the district court's 
contin ued funding order. 155 The First Circuit exhi bi ted some con-
cern over the possibility of excessive intrusion into matters of local 
control by discussing possible alternatives to the district court's 
order. 15ft However, the court of appeals concluded that the differ-
ences in cost between the lower court's order and the available alter-
natives were minimal, and therefore held that the order did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 157 
Inmates II represents the only time in the course of the Charles 
Street Jail litigation that the court of appeals affirmed a district 
court funding order is.sued without prior approval by the defendant 
officials responsible for appropriating city funds. 15s Although the 
IS' Special Project, supra note 3, at 809-12. 
1S2 The Mayor and the nine City Councillors of Boston will be referred to as the city 
defendants. 
153 This order was made after an informal hearing in the district court and is referred to on 
appeal. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241, 1242 (1st Cir. 1975). 
'54 [d. 
155 [d. at 1243-44. 
'56 [d. The possible alternatives discussed by the court were: (1) joining the state agency 
responsible for apportioning the federal funds as a defendant and ordering it to continue 
funding; (2) ordering transfer of some of the federal prisoners housed in the Charles Street 
Jail to other institutions; or (3) using the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act to 
provide funds for continuation of the Bail Appeals Project. [d. 
157 [d. at 1244. 
'" CITY OF BOSTON CODE St. 6 §§ 251, 253 (1975) provides that City Council approval is 
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First Circuit did not extensively discuss the scope of the district 
court's equitable powers, it did find that a "clear and convincing 
showing of necessity"158 was not a prerequisite to their use; its af-
firmance of the funding order implied that the district court's invo-
cation of equity powers was proper. 180 
The court of appeals' action seems appropriate. Double celling in 
the Charles Street Jail was within the scope of the violation, so that 
the district court's single celling order aimed at correcting that vio-
lation was a proper remedy. Moreover, although there are considera-
ble advantages to party participation in decree formulation,161 uni-
lateral judicial action is not excessively intrusive when aimed at 
relieving the plaintiffs from an oppressive condition pending 
broader relief. 182 Therefore, since the city-defendants' decision to 
terminate funds for the Bail Appeals Project threatened to frustrate 
the single celling order, the order to continue its funding certainly 
fell within the court's enforcement power.'83 
3. Inmates ill-The Deer Island Plan 
During the spring and summer of 1975, the city defendants pro-
posed a plan for the renovation and modernization of the Hill Prison 
on Deer Island, a peninsula in Boston Harbor. The plaintiffs and the 
necessary for capital expenditures by the City of Boston, whether in the form of appropria-
tions orders or loan orders. The City Council can alter the amount of a loan, reject any item 
of a loan order, or alter the disposition of the proceeds by a two-thirds vote of the councillors 
at two readings. CITY OF BOSTON CODE St. § 15 (1975) provides that the Mayor can veto a 
loan order. A two-thirds vote of the City Council, however, will override this veto. The Boston 
City Councillors Memorandum of Law Concerning Responsibility for the Selection of a Jail 
Site at 4; Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass.) 
, .. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241, 1242 (1st Cir. 1975). 
110 The court of appeals cited two cases which hold that a federal court may enjoin state 
officials "upon a strong showing of necessity." Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 
194 (5th Cir. 1967); Alabama Pub. Service Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951). 
"' See text at note 140, supra. 
112 Special Project, supra note 3, at 801. However, unilateral judicial action aimed at 
immediately relieving oppressive conditions leaves the defendants to grapple with the admin-
istrative problems resulting from the order. Inmates II exemplifies the Charles Street Jail 
defendants' attempt to resolve some of these problems. See also Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 
318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978). 
'03 For a comprehensive treatment of the position that federal district courts do not have 
the power to order increased local expenditures in institution reform cases, with a mention 
of the Bail Appeals Project order as an example of excessive action, see Frug, supra note 95, 
at 724. 
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county defendantsl84 opposed this plan. 16s However, on October 20, 
1975, the district court accepted the plan and ordered its implemen-
tation. 188 This order included a provision that "[ t ]he defendants 
shall take such steps and expend such sums of money as are 
necessary to completely renovate and modernize the Hill Prison at 
Deer Island . . . in accordance with plans submitted to :the 
court."187 To facilitate implementation of the Deer Island Plan, the 
district court extended the deadline for closing the Charles Street 
Jail to July 1, 1977.188 Both the plaintiffs and the defendant Sheriff 
of Suffolk County appealed the Deer Island Plan. 169 
The Mayor then submitted for the approval of the City CounciP70 
a proposed order for the appropriation of $8,500,000 to implement 
the Deer Island Plan.171 The City Council believed that it would be 
irresponsible to approve the Mayor's appropriations order on the 
basis of the minimal information they were given concerning the 
plan,172 and therefore rejected the order by a vote of six to two, with 
one councillor abstaining. 173 The district court responded to this 
vote with an order to the City Councillors to show cause why they 
should not be held in contempt of court; 174 the City Councillors 
opposed the show cause order. However, when the Commissioner of 
Correction withdrew his support of the plan175 because the Deer 
Island site had been preempted for use as a secondary sewage treat-
ment plant,178 the contempt order was mooted and the order for 
'" The Sheriff of Suffolk County and the master of the Charles Street Jail will be referred 
to as the county defendants. 
, .. Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 7. 
, .. Memorandum and Order Modifying Decree Dated June 20, 1973, Inmates ofthe Suffolk 
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. October 20, 1975). 
'87 [d. at 4 (emphasis added) . 
... [d . 
• " Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 7. 
"0 See note 125, supra. 
I7t Order to Show Cause at 1, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-
162-G (D. Mass. May 26, 1976). 
172 Brief for Defendant City Councillors at 5, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
stadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass). 
173 Order to Show Cause of May 26, 1976, supra note 171, at 2. 
m [d. at 3-4. For a discussion of the contempt sanction as an enforcement device see text 
at notes 271-79, supra. 
'75 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 34 § 14 (1958) provides that the Commissioner of Correction must 
approve any plan for construction of a jail. 
'78 Memorandum of Decision Regarding July 28, 1976 Order and Confirmatory Orders at 
2, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. October 6, 1976). 
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implementation of the Deer Island Plan was vacated,l77 Signifi-
cantly, the court held that its order to close the Charles Street Jail 
by July 1, 1977 remained in effect,I7S In addition, the district court 
appointed a special master to oversee the defendants' efforts to 
devise a plan for a replacement facility,I79 
In opposing the show cause order, the City Councillors argued 
that by directly ordering the Council to expend monies, the court 
had gone beyond the relief usually granted in prison and jail reform 
cases,lSO This argument takes issue primarily with the form of the 
court's order since the practical effect of the funding order was the 
same as the effect of the closing order in Inmates 1. As the court in 
Inmates I noted, "without question, the [closing order] will impose 
an economic burden upon the taxpayers of Suffolk County, 
[however] a deprivation of constitutional rights may not be justi-
fied upon economic considerations,"lsl In fact, courts in prison and 
jail reform cases have consistently held that a lack of funds provides 
no excuse for noncompliance with court orders,Is2 For example, the 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has 
forcefully stated that: 
the obligation of the Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitu-
tionalities does not depend upon what the Legislature may do, or upon 
what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon what Respondents may 
177 [d. at 1. 
178 [d. at 4. 
17. For a discussion of the use of special masters at the decree formulation stage, see text 
and notes at 145-52, supra. 
'80 Brief for Defendant City Councillors, Deer Island Plan, supra note 172, at 8-11. The 
defendants argued that typically courts in prison and jail cases have ordered the responsible 
executive officials, and not the legislative officials, to propose plans to remedy constitutional 
violations. Moreover, when those executive officials do not implement these plans courts have 
imposed sanctions on them. 
181 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973). 
182 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part, remanded in part 
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 
(1978); Costello v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1239, 1252 (5th Cir. 1976); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. 
of Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974), on remand, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), 
aff'd, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), Cert. granted,. 434 U.S. 901 (1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 
F.2d 1291, 1320 (5th Cir. 1974); Barnes v. Government of V.I., 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1227 
(D.V.I. 1976); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 595 (D.P.R. 1976); Morales 
v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 59 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Rhem v. Malcom, 377 F. Supp. 995, 999 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), judgment entered, 389 F. 
Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 
527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion to reopen 
institution); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
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actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas is going to operate a Peniten-
tiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced by 
the Constitution of the United States. 183 
Support for the district court's funding order is found in Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,184 where the Su-
preme Court held that the district court had the power to order local 
officials to levy taxes in order to effect desegregation. 185 Since a 
funding order is an enforcement mechanism - an intrusive, formal 
action employed by a court in order to force the defendants' compli-
ance188 - its use must be based on a finding that the defendants 
were not making a good faith effort at complying with the initial 
decree. Therefore, in Inmates III the City Council should have 
argued solely that the paucity of available information concerning 
the Deer Island Plan evidenced the exercised of their good faith and 
best judgment in rejecting the appropriations. 
4. Inmates IV-City Prison and Middlesex County Jail as Interim 
Facilities 
On June 30, 1977, the district court ordered that the City Prison, 
a facility located in the basement of the Suffolk County Courthouse 
in Boston, be renovated by November 1, 1977 in order to act as an 
interim facility for confinement of detainees. 187 On that date the 
.83 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970) . 
• 84 377 U.S. 218 (1964) . 
... See text at notes 59-61, supra. The holding to "levy taxes" in Griffin has been cited as 
authority for extensive equitable relief in the following cases: J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 
112, 140 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that a statute which provides for voluntary admission of 
minor children to mental hospital by parents or guardian violates due process; remedy in-
cluded order that defendants spend such money of State of Georgia as is necessary to provide 
non-hospital facilities and to place the children in such facilities); Bradley v. Milliken, 540 
F.2d 229, 244 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that state must pay certain percentage of costs for 
desegregation plan); Morgan v. McDonough, 548 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that 
district court acted properly in directing school committee to vote to hire certain administra-
tors for school placed in receivership, because in extreme circumstances the equity power of 
the federal court extends to orders controlling actions of elected officials in the exercise of 
their duties). See generally Comment, Enforcement of Judicial Financing Orders: Constitu-
tional Rights in Search of a Remedy, 59 Gso. L. REv. 393 (1970). 
... See text and note at note 94, supra . 
• 87 Memorandum and Orders Regarding Renovation of City Prison Facility and Closing of 
Charles Street Jail, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. 
June 30,1977). This order was based, with slight modifications, on a November 2,1976 report 
entitled Masters Report of Use of City Prison Facility. This was one of three reports filed by 
the special master as a result of extensive hearings which he held between October 1976 and 
March 1977. Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 9. The two other reports filed 
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Charles Street Jail was to be closed to incoming detainees,lHH In 
addition, the court ordered the Mayor to submit, for the City Coun-
cillors' approval, appropriation orders sufficient to accomplish the 
renovation and staffing of City Prison,Is9 Moreover, the dIstrict court 
ordered the City Councillors to "take such steps and expend such 
sums as are reasonable and necessary to complete the repairs and 
renovations, , ,which have been found to be necessary to the pro-
posed use of the city prison facility,"190 
All of the parties appealed the City Prison order ,lUI While agreeing 
that the district court had the authority to make such an order when 
the alternative facility meets constitutional standards, the plaintifIs 
argued that City Prison did not meet those constitutional standards 
and that the district court had therefore exceeded the bounds of its 
authority,I92 The Boston City Councillors requested a stay of both 
the City Prison order and the November 1, 1977 closing date, argu-
ing that the funding order was improper because it exceeded the 
nature of the violation,193 Moreover, the City Councillors argued 
that the court's utilization of its equity powers in issuing the City 
Prison order usurped legislative authority over funding as guaran-
teed under both the Tenth Amendmentl94 and principles of federal-
ism,I9G 
In September 1977, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
denied defendants' request for a stay of the closing date, lUG finding 
that the substantive issues of this case had already been decided in 
Inmates 1. 197 However, with respect to the equity arguments, the 
are: Masters Report Concerning Establishment of a Suffolk County Pretrial Detention Facil-
ity to Replace the Charles Street Jail, March 29, 1977; Masters Report on Closing of the 
Charles Street Jail, April 21, 1977. Memorandum and Order of June 30, 1977, supra note 187, 
at 1. 
, .. [d. at 5. This district court order was issued contrary to the suggestion of the master 
that the Charles Street Jail remain open until a new permanent facility was contructed. 
"I [d. at 4. 
'80 [d. (emphasis added). 
"' Brief of the Appellant Boston City Councillors at 4, Eisenstadt v. Inmates of the Suffolk 
County Jail, Nos. 77-1361, 77-1362, 77-1363 (lst Cir.). 
"' Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 29-31. 
183 Brief of Appellant Boston City Councillors, City Prison, supra note 191, at 4-8. 
, .. U.S. CONST., Amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
II. Brief of Appellant City Councillors, City Prison, supra note 191, at 8-15. 
"' Memorandum and Order at 2, Eisenstadt v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, Nos. 77-
1361, 77-1362, 77-1363 (1st Cir. Sept. 2, 1977). 
'" [d.; see also text at notes 116-26, supra. 
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First Circuit was less definite. Based on the premise that the respon-
sible executive officials optimally should make decisions concerning 
a replacement facility, the court granted the stay of that part of the 
district court's order requiring renovation of City Prison. IDS In order 
to facilitate this preferred resolution of the issue, the court of ap-
peals suggested that Judge Garrity provide general guidelines for 
the standards to be met in a new facility. 199 
Following the court of appeals' stay of the City Prison order,20o the 
Mayor and the Sheriff of Suffolk County began negotiations with 
Middlesex County officials for use of the nearby Middlesex County 
Jail. 201 Mter holding a hearing, the special master filed a report 
recommending the use of the Middlesex County Jail as an interim 
facility, subject to certain alterations, to house not more than 123 
pretrial detainees at anyone time.202 On October 25, 1977, the dis-
trict court adopted the master's findings, with certain modifica-
tions.203 
Once again political disputes interfered with implementation of 
the district court's order, as the City Council failed to pass loan 
orders submitted by the Mayor for the funding of the court-adopted 
Middlesex County Jail plan. 204 Following a hearing, the district 
... [d. at 4. 
I" [d. Moreover, the court's decision was also based on the imminence of a determination 
of the issues on appeal. [d. The First Circuit's suggestion that Judge Garrity provide general 
guidelines reflects a recognition of the fact that the district court had the power to review 
the constitutionality of facilities other than the Charles Street Jail. Brief of Inmates on 
Appeal, supra note 100, at 24. 
200 [d. 
201 The Middlesex County Jail is located on the top floor of the Middlesex County Court-
house in East Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
202 Memorandum and Orders Regarding the Use of Middlesex County Jail and the Closing 
of Charles Street Jail at 1-2, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G 
(D. Mass. Nov. 2, 1977). Plaintiffs opposed use of the Middlesex County Jail because the 
Cambridge fire chief felt it was a fire hazard, and because it did not conform to minimum 
standards of confinement for detainees. Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 32-
34. On September 30, 1977 the district court referred the matter of the Middlesex County 
Jail to the special master. This oral order was then confirmed by a written order of October 
4, 1977. Memorandum and Orders, Nov. 2, 1977, supra note 202, at 1. 
203 [d. The modifications were that the glass barriers in the inmate visiting rooms be 
replaced by a heavy-duty screen rather than be removed altogether, and that a program of 
contact visits be established for the detainees. [d. at 2 . 
... On October 26, 1977 and October 31, 1977 the City Council voted down loan orders 
submitted by the Mayor for construction of a new permanent facility. On October 31, 1977 
the City Council rejected the Mayor's request for $1,100,000 to renovate City Prison and for 
$2,000,000 to lease, staff and operate the Middlesex County Jail. Both of the Mayor's requests 
were dated October 28, 1977. [d. at 2. 
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court, on November 2, 1977, ordered that the Mayor, after confer-
ring with the Sheriff, submit a request to the City Council for the 
appropriations necessary to allow use of Middlesex County Jail as 
an interim facility; the court also ordered the City Council to 
promptly approve the appropriations when submitted by the 
Mayor.205 Furthermore, the court extended the November 1, 1977 
closing deadline to a date five weeks after the City Council's ap-
proval of the appropriations.2041 
Plaintiffs appealed from both the October 25, 1977 and the Nov-
ember 2, 1977 orders, while the defendants appealed only from the 
November 2, 1977 order.207 Possessing parallel issues, these appeals 
and the appeals from the district court's City Prison orders were 
consolidated.208 In its decision, the court of appeals stayed until 
March 3, 1978 the district court's injunction which ordered the ap-
propriation of the necessary renovation funds and required the clos-
ing of the Charles Street Jail five weeks after the City Council's 
approval of appropriations.208 Once again, the First Circuit based 
this decision on its holding that the responsible executive officials 
ideally should decide on a new facility. Nonetheless, although find-
ing that the possibility of the parties reaching an agreement without 
judicial intervention still existed,2lO the First Circuit did specify that 
such an agreement must include a commitment to provide adequate 
funds for both interim and long term facilities, as well as specifica-
tions concerning a new jail site and target dates for its construc-
tion.211 However, that part of the court's holding concerning the 
extent of the district court's equity powers, should they be required 
to enforce its orders, remained ambiguous: 
... [d. at 4. 
2flI [d. On October 28, 1977 Sheriff Kearney had filed a motion requesting that the Mayor 
and City Councillors be ordered immediately to provide funds for the Middlesex County Jail 
and that the November 1, 1977 closing date be extended to December 6, 1977 to give the 
Sheriff sufficient time to prepare for use of the Middlesex County Jail. [d. at 2. 
267 Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 16. 
26' [d. at 16 n.52 . 
... Memorandum and Order, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, Nos. 77-1361, 
77-1362,77-1363 (1st Cir. Dec. 15, 1977). The First Circuit agreed to this stay because of the 
short time period involved. Oral argument was heard in December, 1977. Inmates of the 
Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 99 (1st Cir. 1978). 
210 Memorandum and Order, Dec. 15, 1979, supra note 209, at 1-2. The court based this 
finding on the following facts: a new City Council had come into office, a portion of the 
planning for a new jail had already been completed by the city and county, and federal 
legislation which would assist financing of a dual·purpose facility was pending. [d. at 2. 
211 [d. at 3. 
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the parties should understand that whatever the status of affairs by 
March 3, this court does not envisage further or protracted delay in this 
matter. Failing the cooperation and assistance of the various parties in 
developing and implementing a solution to the problem of pretrial detai-
nee incarceration, this court will be left with no alternative but to au-
thorize far-reaching action by the district court. 212 
Finally, on March 17, 1978, the court of appeals, after noting that 
the parties were not closer to reaching an agreement, affirmed the 
district court's order prohibiting confinement of pretrial detainees 
at the Charles Street Jai1. 213 This decision marked a turning point 
in the Charles Street Jail litigation. The First Circuit held that, 
unless the defendants proposed an acceptable plan for a new perma-
nent facility at the Charles Street site2U or at another site, including 
commitments to funding its construction and target dates for its 
completion, the Charles Street Jail would be closed on October 2, 
1978.215 The court postponed consideration of the district court's 
City Prison and Middlesex County Jail orders until the city defen-
dants accepted a plan for a new permanent facility.216 Moreover, 
rather than remanding to the district court for enforcement of its 
closing order, the First Circuit exercised its jurisdiction, and itself 
undertook to enforce the order. Closing the Charles Street Jail on 
October 2, 1978 thus became a reality which only the Mayor and 
City Council could avoid by agreeing to a plan for a replacement 
facility which met district court approval. 
Inmates IV illustrates two important points. First, in molding a 
remedy which complied with the mandate of Inmates I, both the 
212 [d. at 4 (emphasis added). The First Circuit was vague as to the propriety of the district 
court's funding order, probably because, given the poor conditions in City Prison (see text at 
note 192, supra), this was not a proper case for consideration of the merits of that question. 
Moreover, at this point in the litigation, the First Circuit had not determined that the 
defendants had ceased to exercise good faith; therefore, in its view, any enforcement mecha-
nism was inappropriate. See text at notes 236-38, infra. 
213 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 100 (1st Cir. 1978). 
21, [d. at 100-01. Until March 1, 1978, the City Council was deadlocked on selecting a site 
for a new pretrial detention center. Five votes were the most cast in favor of anyone proposal 
and six votes were needed. Finally, on March 1, 1978, six councillors agreed to a $10,000,000 
loan order for a pretrial detention center at the Charles Street site. This loan order passed 
the required second reading on March 22, 1978; however, it was then disapproved by the 
Mayor and therefore was no longer viable. Brief of Appellant Boston City Councillors on 
Appeal from Orders of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
Dated May 2, 1978 at 2, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 78-1216 (1st Cir.). 
215 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1978). 
211 [d. at 101. 
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district court and the First Circuit afforded great deference to the 
defendants' right to local control of their institutions, giving them 
many opportunities to comply with its order. However, throughout 
the litigation, and especially in Inmates IV, the cumulative effect 
of numerous political and budgetary factors militated against the 
defendants' willingness to comply with the district court's decree. 
During the first four years of the remedy stage, the opposition of 
many of the City Councillors to compliance with the court's order 
may have stemmed from the unpopularity of Judge Garrity result-
ing from his involvement in the Boston school desegregation case, 
as well as the political gains to be gotten by such public recal-
citrance.217 Moreover, no City Councillor wanted to vote for a site 
which would place the new jail in his own neighborhood. 218 Further-
more, some of the councillors wanted to solve the problems at the 
Deer Island House of Correction at the same time they were dealing 
with those at the Charles Street Jail; such a combined solution 
hopefully would have entitled the City to federal subsidies amount-
ing to $15,000,000.219 In addition, commercial developers were ap-
parently interested in the Charles Street Jail site; sale of this valua-
ble downtown property which borders an affluent residential area, 
overlooks the Charles River and is proximate to Boston's thriving 
downtown area, would have entitled the City to a substantial pur-
chase price and additional monies resulting from increased tax 
revenues.220 In general, elected officials may be reluctant to approve 
increased spending to remedy conditions in institutions which are 
not visible to the public and about which many voters are uncon-
cerned. 221 Moreover, political realities make elected officials far 
more concerned with their constituents' views than with those of a 
ZI1 See Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. 
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), enforced by, 401 F. 
Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976), 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), enforced by, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub 
nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (appointment of receiver). See 
generally Roberts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South 
Boston High School, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (1976). 
218 Brief of Boston City Councillors dated May 2, 1978, Moyer Plan, supra note 214, at 6. 
m [d. 
220 [d. 
221 On the other hand, opposing unpopular court orders can generate votes. For example, 
in the Boston school desegregation case, the public was strongly opposed to desegregation. 
The Boston School Committee found refusal to cooperate with the district court to be a 
popular political position. Goldstein, supra note 5, at 69-71 n.332. 
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politically disenfranchised group such as prisoners. 222 
Second, Inmates IV demonstrates that, once the lower federal 
courts determine that deference to local control of institutions has 
not effectuated the desired remedy, the courts must end their moni-
toring function 223 and enforce their decrees. The hearings which pre-
ceded the court's June 30, 1977 City Prison order demonstrate that, 
in Judge Garrity's view, the balance had shifted in favor of the 
plaintiffs' rights. The court expressed frustration at the blurring 
which had occurred between judicial, legislative and executive res-
ponsibilities.224 The court also expressed as its primary concern the 
enforcement of its "constitutional mandate"225 to close the Charles 
Street Jail as ordered in Inmates I, and alluded to the well-
established principle that lack of funds is not a judicially recognized 
excuse for noncompliance with a remedial decree. 226 Judge Garrity 
explained: 
the city's obligation cannot, in my understanding of the law and of the 
responsibilities of all of us here, cannot be thought of in terms of contin-
gencies. The moment the cost of complying with a constitutional man-
date gets in its way, the responsibility of the Court becomes clear, and 
the Court cannot permit the parties in the case to think in terms 
of-about contingencies, the contingency of the federal funding. There 
is nothing contingent about the requirement under the laws of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and there is nothing contingent about the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .227 
Since by June 30, 1977 the district court had determined that the 
defendants had ceased to exercise good faith, it attempted to en-
force Inmates I by enjoining the defendants from admitting detain-
ees to the Charles Street Jail after November 1, 1977. However, the 
court was concerned that" 'public safety necessitates provision of 
22'2 Chayes notes that the fact that prisoners, inmates in mental institutions, and ghetto 
dwellers have no real access to the legislative process argues for increased judicial activism 
under the public law litigation model. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1315. 
223 Despite the numerous political and budgetary factors militating against compliance the 
court remained a monitor throughout Inmates IV. The court utilized retention of jurisdiction, 
compliance reports, and appointment of a special master as its monitoring mechanisms. See 
text at notes 135-36, and note 179, supra. 
22. Excerpt of Proceedings-After Recess at 11-16, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. 
Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 10, 1977). 
'" Id. at 15. 
228 See text at notes 181-83, supra. 
227 Excerpt of Proceedings-After Recess at 15-16, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. 
Eisenstadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 10, 1977). 
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an assured replacement detention facility where persons committed 
after November 1, who are too dangerous for predisposition release, 
may be jailed' ";228 therefore, the court attempted to provide an in-
terim facility.229 At this stage of the litigation, the City Councillors 
once again utilized the principles of federalism to argue that the 
district court had gone beyond the scope of its equitable powers. The 
City Councillors also argued that the court's order established a 
remedy beyond the nature of the violation as construed by the court 
in Inmates 1. 230 The latter argument is not persuasive because prac-
ticality necessitates that the court have the power to look beyond 
the boundaries of the Charles Street Jail in order to insure a consti-
tutional remedy for the plaintiffs. In fact, the First Circuit implic-
itly recognized this power when it suggested that the district court 
provide the defendants with general guidelines for a replacemept 
facility.231 Moreover, it is obvious from the court's closing order in 
Inmates I that subsequent remedial orders could not have been 
limited to the confines of the Charles Street Jail. In essence, both 
arguments advanced by the City Councillors seem to take issue with 
the intrusiveness of the district court's orders.232 Although use of 
City Prison was not proposed by the parties,233 the district court's 
228 Brief of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 11. 
22. Judge Garrity stated that his motivation in ordering use of City Prison as an interim 
facility was concern for the public safety. Id. However, Judge Garrity may also have, under-
standably, been reacting to city defendants who, as they had done in the Boston School 
desegregation case, refused to comply with court orders. 
230 Brief of Appellant Boston City Councillors, City Prison, supra note 191, at 4-8. 
The well-tailored remedy, consonant with limitations on the power of federal courts, for 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Charles Street Jail is either an improve-
ment of conditions at the jailor closure. The District Court's first opinion reflected a 
correct understanding of the limitations on the equitable powers of federal courts. . . . 
In contrast to the first orders entered in this case, the City Prison orders exceed the 
authority of federal courts to remedy the constitutional violations found at the Jail. . . . 
The City Prison orders to renovate and operate an entirely separate facility plainly are 
not a remedy for the unconstitutional confinement of plaintiffs at Charles Street. The 
remedy exceeds the scope of the violation. 
Id. at 7. 
231 Memorandum on Orders of September 2, 1977 supra note 196, at 4. See also Brief of 
Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 24. 
232 As to the City Council's argument that the court's orders violated the Tenth Amend-
ment, in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken IT) the Supreme Court held that "[t]he Tenth 
Amendment's reservation of non-delegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal 
'court judgment enforcing the express provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Brief of 
Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 28 n.65, Citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 
(1977). 
233 Use of City Prison as a temporary facility was first proposed by Sheriff Eisenstadt in 
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orders seem to be a necessary intrusion in light of the court's four 
and a half year attempt to defer to local legislative and executive 
control. However, it should be noted that the court's unilateral im-
position of a plan for use of City Prison might not have been neces-
sary if the court had sought input from the parties at the decree 
formulation stage. 234 
Although the district court determined, prior to issuing the City 
Prison Order of June 30, 1977, that the defendants had failed to 
exercise good faith,235 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit did 
not at that time share this view. The First Circuit's decisions to stay 
the City Prison Order238 and to stay the injunction against the use 
of the Charles Street Jail until March 3, 1978237 evidence this fact. 
The appeals court based its view on the finding that, ideally, the 
local officials should make decisions concerning a new facility. How-
ever, in its decision of March 17, 1978 the court of appeals found a 
lack of good faith on the part of the defendants and decided to 
enforce the Inmates I mandate by closing the Charles Street Jail on 
October 2, 1978.238 
5. Inmates V-The Moyer and City Plans for a Permanent Re-
placement Facility 
On April 12, 1978, the City Council voted to adopt the Moyer 
Plan,239 which called for reconstruction of the Charles Street Jail as 
a permanent facility.240 The Council also passed at the first read-
/ 
September, 1976. Next, in November, 1976, its use was proposed by the Special Master. Brief 
of Inmates on Appeal, supra note 100, at 11 n.28. 
23< See text at notes 140-44, supra. 
23. See text at notes 180-87, supra. 
... See text and note at note 198, supra. 
237 See text and notes at notes 209-10, supra . 
... A difference in the timing between the district court's and the court of appeals' determi-
nations of when the defendants have ceased to exercise good faith is also evident in Welsch 
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), supplemented, 68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn. 1975), 
a/I'd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975), a/I'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 
(8th Cir. 1977). In 1974 the district court held that the conditions in Minnesota mental 
hospitals violated due process requirements. In 1976, the court enjoined the enforcement of a 
Minnesota constitutional provision and certain fiscal control stat!ltes proscribing legislative 
and administrative procedures for appropriating and expending state funds. The injunction 
was intended to eliminate fiscal obstacles to implementation of the district court's first order. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dissolved the district court's injunction, finding 
that the state legislature was entitled to an opportunity to appropriate the funds and remedy 
the unconstitutional facilities without court intervention. ld. 
238 Brief of Boston City Councillors dated May 2, 1978, Moyer Plan, supra note 214, at 2 . 
• 41 The Boston City Councillors' Opposition to the Commissioner of Corrections' "Answer" 
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ing241 a loan order of $12,000,000 to facilitate adoption of this plan.242 
On May 2, 1978, after a hearing concerning the Moyer Plan, the 
district court held that it would not review the plan until the City 
Council approved a loan order for $13,983,000 plus whatever addi-
tional sum they felt would be needed for incidental site work and 
professional fees. 243 The City Council immediately appealed this 
order,244 and two weeks later failed to pass at the second reading the 
$12,000,000 loan order.245 The City Council then passed a resolution 
stating that, if Judge Garrity approved the Moyer Plan as constitu-
tionally sound and ordered it implemented and adequately funded, 
the Council would appropriate the necessary money amounting to 
at least $12,000,000. Moreover, the Council resolved not to appeal 
such an order provided it "does not specify an unreasonably large 
amount to be appropriated."248 The Mayor opposed the Moyer Plan, 
instead preferring a plan for construction of a facility on Nashua 
Street in Boston to replace both the Charles Street Jail and the Deer 
Island House of Correction.247 
at 2 n.3, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 8075 (1st Cir.). 
2<1 See note 158, supra. 
242 Brief of Boston City Councillors dated May 2, 1978, Moyer Plan, supra note 178, at 2. 
This plan was orginally proposed by Fredric D. Moyer, an architect and then .chairman of 
the National Clearing House for Criminal Justice. During the fall of 1976 the plan was 
presented to the special master who then decided it was superior to two other plans before 
him. [d. at 1. 
.. 3 Memorandum and Procedural Orders at 2, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisen-
stadt, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 2, 1978). Judge Garrity based this holding on the fact 
that the court of appeals would not consider a plan for a permanent facility unless it was 
coupled with a commitment to adequate funding. Since the cost estimate for the Moyer Plan 
was $14,000,000, and the City Council had only approved a $12,000,000 loan order, the district 
court concluded that the City Council must approve a loan order in the sum of $13,983,000 
plus whatever was needed for incidental site work and professional fees in order to meet the 
First Circuit's approval. [d. at 1-2. 
m Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, slip op. at 2, No. 78-1216 (1st Cir. June 
15, 1978) . 
... Brief of Boston City Councillors dated May 2, 1978, Moyer Plan, supra note 214, at 2. 
2 .. [d. at 3. 
[d . 
Resolved that if the United States District Court approves the Moyer Plan as meeting 
constitutional standards, and if the District Court orders the Moyer Plan implemented 
and adequately funded, the Boston City Council will vote forthwith by at least the neces-
sary six votes at its necessary two readings, to pass a loan order to be in an amount not 
less than $12,000,000. The Council will not appeal the order referred to above, provided 
the order does not specify an unreasonably large amount to be appropriated. 
.., Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, slip op. at 3, No. 78-1216 (1st Cir. June 
15, 1978); Boston Globe, September 29, 1978 at 14, col. 1. One could speculate that the Mayor 
preferred a Nashua Street plan because the Nashua Street site was not in a residential area 
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On June 15, 1978, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's 
May 2, 1978 decision to reserve consideration of the constitution-
ality of the Moyer Plan.248 However, the court of appeals suggested 
that a review of the Moyer Plan by Judge Garrity might, by 
"clarifying the choice to be made by elected officials, "249 facilitate 
a quick resolution to the problem of a permanent replacement facil-
ity. In a June 29, 1978 memorandum, the district court rejected this 
suggestion, suggesting that review at this stage would "enlist the 
court on one side of a political field where it should not tread. "ZaO 
Although the City Council appealed this memorandum, the First 
Circuit affirmed the district court, stating that "[i]n a good faith 
dispute between the executive and the legislature in which no provi-
sion of constitution or law is implicated, the court's role is lim-
ited."251 Significantly, the court of appeals reasserted the October 
2, 1978 closing date for the jail. 252 
On September 28, 1978, the city defendants filed the City Plan 
with the district court for approva1.253 The City Plan entailed "a 
written description of the conditions of confinement of pretrial de-
tainees as permitted in the opinion of the Court of Appeals dated 
and therefore there was little chance of this plan alienating any of his constituents. Further-
more, problems had arisen concerning the conditions at the Deer Island House of Correction 
and the Mayor might have seen this as an opportunity to improve that situation. 
248 Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, slip op. at 4, No. 78-1216 (1st Cir. June 
15, 1978). The First Circuit based its decision on a finding that the parties held "sharply 
disparate positions." Moreover, the court noted that at the time of the district court's May 2 
decision, the City Council had put a ceiling on its funding of the Moyer Plan and their voting 
process was only half completed, indicating merely a potential commitment to adequate 
funding. Id. 
2" Id. at 5, cited in Memorandum, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney at 3, No. 
71-162-G (D. Mass. June 29, 1978). 
We observe, without intending to tie the court's hands, that any long range plan advanced 
in good faith with facially reasonable claims to constitutional adequacy and assurance of 
implementation may with profit be judicially scrutinized. Whether the result be to iden-
tify a plan that will pass constitutional muster or to expose a plan as fatally defective, 
there will be a benefit in clarifying the choice to be made by elected officials. 
Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, slip op. at 5, No. 78-1216 (1st Cir. June 15, 
1978). 
,... Memorandum dated June 29, 1978, supra note 249, at 3. 
211) Memorandum and Order at 2, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 78-
8075 (1st Cir. July 25, 1978). 
252 Id. at 3. 
283 Memorandum and Orders as to Pretrial Detention Center at 1, Inmates of the SufIolk 
County Jail v. Kearney, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 1978). The City Plan was developed 
by Boston's Public Facilities Department. Boston Globe, September 29, 1978 at 14, col. 1. 
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March 17, 1978"254 and called for the renovation and reconstruction 
of the Charles Street Jail to comply with these conditions.255 Al-
though the City Council also concurrently passed loan orders total-
ling $15,400,000 for implementation of this plan, the Mayor with-
held his approval.256 The following day, Judge Garrity announced 
that the Mayor's refusal to sign the loan order meant that the 
Charles Street Jail would be closed on October 2,1978.257 The Mayor 
stated that he was withholding his signature in order to give a group 
of disconcerted residents of Beacon Hill, the neighborhood border-
ing the Charles Street Jail, an opportunity to propose a new plan 
for a replacement facility.258 One day before the closing date, the 
Mayor reluctantly signed the $15,400,000 loan order,259 and Judge 
Garrity vacated the court's injunction against use of the Charles 
Street Jail after October 2, 1978.260 On October 2, 1978, the district 
court held that the Mayor, City Councillors and Commissioner of 
Correction had proposed an acceptable plan for construction of a 
new jail as required by the First Circuit's opinion of March 17, 
1978,281 and therefore that pretrial detainees could continue to be 
housed at the Charles Street Jail pending further order of the court 
concerning an interim facility. 282 
The October 2, 1978 Memorandum and Order in Inmates Vl83 
materially altered the status of the Charles Street Jail litigation. In 
that order the district court stressed that "[t]he city, county and 
state defendants shall without delay take all steps reasonably 
necessary to carry out the provisions of said preliminary, modified 
and final architectural program and estimated design schedule."264 
Ironically, after six years of implementation, the defendants were 
under a remedial order which closely paralleled the "all deliberate 
speed" order of Brown II. 265 While addressing the plaintiffs' rights 
2 .. Memorandum and Orders Oct. 2, 1978, supra note 253, at 2; see also text at notes 213-
17, supra. 
m Memorandum and Orders Oct. 2, 1978, supra note 253, at 2-3 . 
... Boston Globe, September 29, 1978 at 14, col. 1. 
.. , Boston Globe, September 30, 1978 at 1, col. 1. 
... [d . 
... Boston Globe, October 2, 1978 at 3, col. 3. 
218 Order Vacating Injunction and Notice, Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 
No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. October 2, 1978). 
211 See text at notes 213-17, supra. 
"". Memorandum and Orders Oct. 2, 1978, supra note 253, at 3. 
203 Memorandum and Orders Oct. 2, 1978, supra note 253 . 
• 84 [d. at 4 (emphasis added). 
"". See text at notes 55-57, supra. 
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through implementation of the City Plan, the order is also suffi-
ciently vague to accommodate the defendants' rights to local control 
of their institutions by determining the details of compliance. Be-
cause the City Plan which Judge Garrity approved specifies only the 
basic conditions of confinement,266 it will in all likelihood require 
modification as its development proceeds. 267 If implementation of 
the City Plan proves more costly than has been anticipated,268 and 
the City Council and the Mayor then refuse to appropriate addi-
tional funds, the district court will be forced to once again balance 
the plaintiffs' right to incarceration in a facility meeting due process 
standards against the defendants' rights to local control of their 
institutions. However, since implementation proceedings have al-
ready spanned six years, this balancing process should favor the 
plaintiffs. Moreover, since future implementation delays will relate 
only to the City Plan, a funding order directed at enforced compli-
ance with this plan would clearly be within the scope of the district 
court's equitable powers. Such a funding order would directly paral-
lel Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 269 
where extreme intransigence on the part of the defendants 
prompted the Supreme Court to hold that the district court could 
order local officials to levy taxes in order to finance desegregation. 270 
6. Possible Future Enforcement Procedures 
a. Contempt Charges 
If enforcement of the City Plan becomes necessary,271 several en-
20. Memorandum and Orders Oct. 2, 1978, supra note 253, at 2-3. 
20' In fact, The Suffolk County Detention Center, Charles Street Facility Architectural 
Program dated January 1, 1979, which elaborates upon the skeletal City Plan, notes the need 
for futher evaluations regarding structural stability, heating, ventilation and air conditioning, 
architectural considerations, site issues, construction phasing, and operating costs. 
20' This contingency is distinctly possible and even probable. Both the St. Louis architec-
tural firm retained to draft the plan and the State Correction Department expressed doubts 
about the adequacy of the $15,400,000 loan orders. Boston Globe, September 29, 1978 at 14, 
col. 1. 
'" 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
270 See text at notes 48-50, supra. 
271 In light of the Consent Decree signed by all the parties on May 7, 1979, Consent Decree, 
Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 71-162-G (D. Mass. May 7, 1979); see 
note 11, supra, if the city plan proves more costly than had been anticipated and the city 
defendants feel unable to appropriate the additional monies, they will move the court to 
modify the consent decree. The district court would probably deny this motion. If the defen-
dants still refuse to appropriate additional funds, the district court will utilize one or a 
number of enforcement mechanisms. 
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forcement mechanisms will be available to the district court. First, 
the court may utilize the most conventional enforcement device and 
hold noncomplying defendants in civil contempt of court.272 A court 
may impose civil contempt sanctions upon a finding that 
"defendants violated their obligations under the decree by failures 
of diligence, effective control, and steadfast purpose to effectuate 
the prescribed goals."273 Moreover, while intent to violate the court 
order is not a necessary element of civil contempt,274 the defendants' 
ability to comply is a prerequisite to imposition of a contempt sanc-
tion.2711 Contempt sanctions are generally an effective inducement to 
compliance because they are costly and, indirectly, because they are 
often accompanied by adverse publicity.278 However, contempt 
sanctions have drawbacks as an enforcement mechanism. First, 
they increase antagonism between the defendants, possibly the pub-
lic, and the COurt. 277 Second, they are least effective in cases, such 
as the Charles Street Jail litigation, where the remedies are com-
plex, because an unwilling defendant can avoid sanctions by 
complying with direct court orders yet doing nothing more. 27M Third, 
civil contempt is merely a sanction and does not aid the defendants' 
compliance effort. 
b. Appointment of a Receiver 
A second mechanism which Judge Garrity might utilize to enforce 
the implementation of the City Plan entails placing the Charles 
Street Jail into receivership, just as was done by the District Court 
for the Middle District of Alabama in Newman u. Alabama. 278 In 
that case Judge Frank M. J<thnson placed the Alabama prison sys-
tem into receivership and appointed the Governor of the state as 
receiver. The court explained its action by stating that: 
272 FED. R. CIV. P. 70 provides the court with the power to order civil contempt sanctions. 
See generally Goldstein, supra note 5, at 68 n.32a; Note, supra note 3, at 448·49; Special 
Project, supra note 3, at 838·41. 
27. Aspira of New York v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 423 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), cited in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 670 (D.R.!. 1978). 
274 Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 670 (D.R.I. 1978). 
27. [d. at 671; Special Project, supra note 3, at 839. 
271 Note, supra note 3, at 449. 
277 Special Project, supra note 3, at 839·40. 
278 [d. at 840. The Boston School desegregation litigation provides an example of "minimal 
compliance" by defendants under a contempt order. As a result of this tactic the court placed 
South Boston High School in receivership. See text at notes 279·93, infra. 
27. 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979). 
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time does not stand still, but the Board of Corrections and the Alabama 
Prison System have for six years. Their time has now run out. . . . 
There can be no doubt that the paramount duty of the federal judici-
ary is to uphold the law. That is why, when a state fails to comply with 
the Constitution, the federal courts are compelled to enforce it .... 
Regrettably, such enforcement orders result in the loss of some of the 
autonomy and flexibility the state might have exercised in the control 
of its public institutions had it chosen to accept the responsibility for 
their management before it was too late. 280 
Although receivership is more commonly used as a method for 
court supervision of a business in financial distress,281 it has been 
employed by federal courts in two school desegregation cases,282 and, 
on the authority of the desegregation cases, in a prison reform 
case.283 In institution reform cases the receiver temporarily replaces 
the defendant officials and acts as an agent of the court for the 
limited purpose of assuring compliance with court orders.284 For ex-
ample, in the Boston school desegregation case the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit affirmed Judge Garrity's appointment of the 
superintendant of the school district in which South Boston High 
School is located as receiver. 285 The court found that receivership 
was a reasonable alternative in light of the defendants' noncompli-
ance.288 Moreover, the court cited a federal court's equitable powers 
and the similarities between the duties of receivers and those of 
masters and administrators, as support for its decision. 287 However, 
the court noted that because receivership was an extraordinary rem-
edy it should be limited only to the duration of the conditions which 
necessitate its use. 288 
"0 [d. at 635-36. 
'8\ Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976). 
2.2 Morgan V. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976); Turner V. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 
724 (S.D. Ga. 1966). 
2.3 Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979). The court cited the 
following desegregation cases: Morgan V. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976); Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Green V. County School Bd., 391 
U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Turner V. Goolsby, 255 
F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966). 
2 •• Special Project, supra note 3, at 836-37; Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights 
Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 132-33 (1969). 
, .. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Roberts, The Extent 
of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High School, 12 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 55, 66 (1976) . 
... Morgan V. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533-34 (lst Cir. 1976). 
2.7 [d. at 533. 
2 •• [d. at 535. 
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If the city defendants fail to implement the City Plan, receiver-
ship will be the most viable enforcement alternative available to the 
court. The court has the option of utilizing a variety of outside 
personnel to aid in enforcement, just as it had this option during the 
decree formulation and monitoring stages of the litigation. 2MB How-
ever, since during the Charles Street Jail litigation the court had 
previously appointed a special master in a monitoring capacity,2BO a 
similar appointment at the enforcement stage would not be viewed 
by the defendants as a severe sanction. Moreover, the six year delay 
in implementation clearly constitutes an extraordinary circum-
stance; therefore, the court would be appropriate in escalating the 
intrusiveness of its outside agent and appointing a receiver. Further-
more, while enforced closing of the Charles Street Jail remains as 
an alternative, and is preferable because it does not introduce an 
additional outside party into the proceedings, receivership is both 
a less stringent and a more promising approach than a closing 
order. ZIt The First Circuit noted the drawbacks of enforced closing 
in Morgan v. McDonough: 212 
finally, it bears emphasizing that the principal alternative being sug-
gested to the receivership order was to order that South Boston High be 
closed. That alternative would not only have involved the abandonment 
of a large and useful facility but would have necessitated the planning, 
expense, and inconvenience of finding places for some 2000 students. 
Without expressing any opinion on the propriety of ordering the School 
closed, it can be said that the district court demonstrated both restraint 
and wisdom in selecting the receivership option.2u3 
Similar drawbacks would plague the enforced closing of the Charles 
Street Jail. 
211 See note 144, supra. 
210 See text at note 179, supra. 
"' In Newman v. Alabama, Judge Johnson noted: 
There is, of course, a more extreme alternative to receivership. In Pugh, the court put 
defendants on notice that failure to comply with the minimum standards set forth in the 
order would necessitate the closing of several prison facilities. In light of that alternative, 
the more reasonable and the more promising approach is the appointment of Governor 
Fob James as receiver for the prison system. 
Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979) . 
... 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) . 
... [d. at 534. It should also be noted that because Judge Garrity appointed a receiver in 
the Boston School desegregation case, there would probably be a tremendous public outcry 
if receivership were to be employed in the Charles Street Jail litigation. 
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c. Closing the Jail 
Despite the preferred qualities of receivership the district court 
might choose to utilize the third and most extreme enforcement 
mechanism available to it-the enforced closing of the Charles 
Street Jail. Although the closing order in Inmates V was not en-
forced, those proceedings do illustrate both the brinksmanship in-
volved in the implementation process following the court-ordered 
closing of a prison or jail, and the potential which closing orders 
have for expediting the defendants' compliance. By threatening the 
imminent closing of the Charles Street Jail, the district court and 
the court of appeals were, in effect, forcing the Mayor and City 
Council to resolve their political dispute and decide on a replace-
ment facility. The Commissioner of Correction warned that, if the 
Mayor and City Council failed to agree on an alternate plan and 
adequate funding by October 2, 1978, and the jail was forced to 
close, "the facilities available . . . will become overcrowded, and 
the burden of relocating and maintaining the present inmates of 
Charles Street [the jail] will be a costly one. The City Council ... 
must be prepared to pay such costS."294 Undoubtedly, the city defen-
dants had this warning in mind when they approved the City Plan 
for a new jail, and would likely continue to heed it should the dis-
trict court close the Charles Street Jail as an enforcement device for 
an unimplemented City Plan. 
Other prison and jail cases have successfully employed closing 
orders,295 which are generally viewed by the courts as particularly 
zo. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, slip op. at 4, No. 78-1216 (lst Cir. June 
15, 1978) . 
... Courts have ordered the closing of offending institutions in the following cases: Palmigi-
ano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), 448 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.1. 1978) (civil contempt 
order); Rhem v. Malcom, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974), afl'd and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), judgment entered, 389 F. Supp. 964 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 
1041 (2d Cir. 1975),432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion to reopen institution); 
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (threatening to close prison unless 
defendants comply with minimum standards for confinement set forth in order), afl'd in part 
and modified in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. denied, 
564 F.2d 97 (5th CiT. 1977),- 466 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (receivership imposed); 
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (finding that abandonment ofinstitu-
tion was necessary to relieve plaintiffs of mistreatment), reu'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 
(5th Cir. 1976) (requiring three-judge court), reu'd and remanded, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (three-
judge court not required), modified, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), reh. denied, 565 F.2d 1215 
(5th Cir. 1977); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976) (defendants 
enjoined from using jail as correctional institution), stay denied, 537 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), 
afl'd, 551 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1977). 
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stringent enforcement devices.298 Just how stringent such orders can 
be is shown by the case of Rhem v. Malcom, 297 in which the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York ordered the "Tombs" 
jail closed due to the defendants' bad faith showing.2u8 Even though 
the defendants did close the Tombs and transfer the inmates to the 
House of Detention on Rikers Island, several consequences flowed 
from the closing of the Tombs which compounded the stringency of 
the order. First, the district court held that plaintiffs' claims regard-
ing the unconstitutional conditions at the Tombs were not mooted 
by transfer to Rikers Island,298 and therefore ordered implementa-
tion at Rikers Island of those reforms ordered in the first Rhem 
opinion which were not tied to the Tombs facility.30o Second, the 
211 Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973). 
The Court does not now forsee that circumstances will arise which would require the 
Court to impose the ultimate sanction available to it, that of closing one or both of the 
prisons or enjoining the further reception of inmates at one or both institutions. Less 
rigorous, but effective, sanctions are available. The court can direct the discharge of 
offending employees; the Court can punish for contempt, and it can award attorney's fees 
and expenses of litigation. So far, the Court has avoided the imposition of sanctions and 
hopes that it will not have to impose any in the future; but, the sanctions are at hand, if 
needed. 
ZI7 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd and 
remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), judgment entered, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 
modified, 396 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), 
432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying motion to reopen institution) 440 F. Supp. 51 
(S.D. N.Y. 1977)(denying motion to modify). 
211 Rhem v. Malcom, 377 F. Supp. 995, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
The history of the case . . . has been one of frustration, largely caused by the City 
defendants' delay and the absence or incompleteness of reports or plans of' perform-
ance .... 
Solely as a result of such noncompliance on the part of the City defendants, we are today 
entering an order that the City defendants close the tombs within thirty days. The order 
is subject to reconsideration at such time as the City defendants submit a 'comprehensive, 
detailed and specific plan' .... 
Cited in Goldstein, supra note 5, at 71 n.332. 
211 Rhem v. Malcom, 389 F. Supp. 964, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
310 [d. at 968-72. This order and the district court's order in Benjamin v. Malcom, No. 75 
Civ.3073 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), a separate case brought on behalf of inmates in the Rikers Island 
facility, extending the Rhem relief to all Rikers Island inmates, were consolidated on appeal 
and affirmed by the Second Circuit in Rhem v. Malcom, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam). This remedy is particularily interesting because it would seem to be beyond the 
nature of the violations found in the Tombs. The court based this remedy on four findings of 
fact. It found that evidence has already been taken as to the conditions at Rikers Island, and 
that no showing had been made of a need for further discovery. Furthermore, the court had 
been instructed by the Second Circuit not to allow further delays. Most significantly, how-
ever, the court found that "the subject o~he pending litigation is, as it has always been 
through its tortuous history, the rights to which plaintiff detainees are entitled under the 
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closing resulted in the defendants requesting the court to approve 
an "elaborate and impressive plan"301 for a renovation of the Tombs 
in order to permit its use as a detention facility. 302 However, the 
court reaffirmed its decision to close the Tombs and denied the 
defendants' request, even though the court was of the opinion that 
the Tombs, if modified according to the City's proposed plan, would 
be adequate for use as a holding facility for detainees or perhaps for 
those inmates who knowingly consent to be housed there. 303 
The closing order in Rhem is distinguishable from the order in 
Inmates V. In Rhem, the defendants' bad faith was far more overt 
and the closing order was actually enforced. On the other hand, in 
the Charles Street Jail litigation, the defendants' bad faith was less 
obvious and their approval of the City Plan removed the need to 
enforce the closing order. Nonetheless, both cases illustrate the po-
tential of closing orders as an enforcement mechanism which the 
district court may once again employ if the defendants fail to imple-
ment the City Plan. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Charles Street Jail litigation represents one of numerous in-
stitution reform cases in the increasingly important area of public 
law litigation. While the public law litigation model will secure 
vindication of plaintiffs' rights, this result will not be immediate. 
Rather, reform litigation under this model is necessarily protracted 
because the court must engage in the difficult process of balancing 
the plaintiffs' rights under the Constitution against the right of the 
defendants to local control of their institutions. 
Under the public law litigation model, the court first finds a right-
violation. It then issues an initial decree which is aimed at remedy-
ing that violation but which is also broad enough to allow the defen-
dants to supply the details of compliance. In the first instance, the 
court unobtrusively monitors compliance; only if it determines that 
the defendants have exceeded the boundaries of good faith will the 
court actively intercede and use its equity powers to enforce its 
Constitution" and that these Constitutional rights "protect[sJ people, not places." Rhem 
v. Malcom, 389 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The source of the final portion of this 
quotation is Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), where the Court held that 
wiretapping the petitioner's conversation in a phone booth violated the Fourth Amendment. 
31. Rhem v. Malcom, 432 F. Supp. 769, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
302 [d. at 770 . 
... [d. at 789. 
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decree. In order to facilitate the implementation process, the court 
may seek aid from the parties as well as from a variety of outside 
experts during the decree formulation and monitoring stages of the 
litigation, and may also employ numerous enforcement mecha-
msms. 
The Charles Street Jail litigation exemplifies some of the pitfalls 
encountered by lower federal courts attempting to implement re-
forms in public law litigation. First, this litigation illustrates the 
importance of participation of parties to the litigation and outside 
the litigation in development of a well-defined initial decree. Next, 
the Charles Street Jail litigation illustrates some of the political and 
budgetary factors which complicate the implementation process in 
public law litigation, regardless of the breadth of the initial decree. 
Moreover, this litigation exemplifies the use of various monitoring 
aids, and the difficulty a court may encounter in making its discre-
tionary determination regarding whether the defendants are exercis-
ing good faith in complying with the initial decree. Finally, the 
Charles Street Jail litigation provides a basis for an examination of 
a variety of enforcement mechanisms which a court may use to 
insure compliance with its initial decree and vindication of the 
plaintiffs' rights. 
The implementation process takes time regardless of whether 
maximum use is made of the public law litigation model. However, 
given the complexities of the fundamental rights at stake and the 
problems encountered in implementing the remedy, the public law 
litigation model, if followed closely, will shorten this process and, 
therefore, remains the most effective method for handling institu-
tion reform cases. 
